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Courts Beyond Judging 
Michael C. Pollack 
Across all fifty states, a woefully understudied institution of 
government is responsible for a broad range of administrative, 
legislative, law enforcement, and judicial functions. That 
important institution is the state courts. While the literature has 
examined the federal courts and federal judges from innumerable 
angles, study of the state courts as institutions of state 
government—and not merely as sources of doctrine and resolvers 
of disputes—has languished. This Article remedies that oversight 
by drawing attention for the first time to the wide array of roles 
state courts serve, and by evaluating the suitability of both the 
allocation of these tasks and the various procedures by which they 
are carried out across the country. 
In every state, on top of the ordinary adversarial dispute-
resolution function that we expect judges to serve, it is state court 
judges who are charged with administrative functions like 
approving applications to change one’s name, to enter the legal 
profession, or to exercise constitutional rights like accessing 
abortion care without parental knowledge or consent. And it is 
often state court judges who are charged with or who have taken 
on a range of legislative and policymaking functions like 
redistricting and establishing specialized criminal courts for 
veterans, persons in need of drug treatment, and others. And in 
some states, it is state court judges who have the law enforcement 
power to decide whether a prosecutor’s charging choice was a wise 
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suggestions, comments, and critiques. I thank the Stephen B. Siegel Program in Real Estate 
Law for research support. 
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exercise of her discretion. These are not mere odds and ends of 
governing either; weighty interests hang in the balance across  
the board. 
In addition to developing this more complete portrait of the 
state courts—and of important variation in how these roles are 
structured across the states—this Article examines whether the 
interests at stake in each context are appropriately served when 
state court judges handle them. In some arenas, they are, and this 
Article places these facets of state court practice on firmer 
theoretical footing. In others, however, there is cause for concern. 
With respect to these tasks, this Article argues that state court 
judges need to be better guided by statute and subject to reason-
giving and record-developing requirements that would channel 
their discretion, improve their decisionmaking, and enable more 
rigorous appellate review. But most important of all, this Article 
calls for states to make more conscious choices about structuring 
the roles they assign to state courts, and for scholars to devote 
more careful attention to these powerful and nuanced institutions.  
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In 1966, a twenty-three-year-old New Yorker named Robert 
Jama decided to change his name to Robert von Jama. He was not 
trying to escape warrants or creditors, nor was he doing anything 
else nefarious. Instead, he believed “von Jama” to have been his 
family name before his ancestors immigrated to the United States 
from Germany generations earlier. Evidently, he wished to honor 
that heritage. He also socialized primarily with friends of German 
origin and sought to fit in better with them.1 
Jama wanted this change to be official, and like every state,  
New York provides a process by which an adult can officially 
change his name. So, Jama made his request to the appropriate 
government entity, which is statutorily meant to grant the name 
change if it is “satisfied” that the representations made in the 
request are true “and that there is no reasonable objection to the 
change of name proposed.”2 The government heard from no one in 
opposition, but it was nonetheless not satisfied with the request. 
Mr. Jama thus remained Mr. Jama. What was the “reasonable 
objection” to the proposed name change? “The moral guilt of the 
Germanic peoples in adopting the philosophies of a monstrosity 
and his cohorts has not yet been fully eradicated or been 
forgotten.”3 Having thus concluded what it means to be a “true” 
American and what it means to be German, the government denied 
Mr. Jama’s petition, declaring for good measure that his “reasons 
for a change are puerile, if not pathetic.”4 
Consider another story. Much more recently, a young woman 
in Alabama desired an abortion. Because she lived in Alabama, she 
needed a parent’s consent; such parental involvement in a minor’s 
decision to have an abortion is required by law in forty-three 
states.5 But because “her father had told her that if she ever came 
home pregnant he would kill her,” and because “her mother was 
also violent and had beaten her older sister until she bled,” she 
believed her parents would “whip her and then kick her out of the 
 
 1. See JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES 153–54 (2011). 
 2. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 63 (McKinney 2014). 
 3. In re Jama, 272 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Reprod. Health Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1284–85 nn.17–18 
(M.D. Ala. 2017); infra Section I.B. 
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house if she told them she was pregnant.”6 Fortunately for this 
young woman, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, while a state 
can permissibly make a minor’s decision to seek an abortion 
contingent on her parent’s consent, such a state “also must provide 
an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion 
can be obtained.”7 Specifically, a minor seeking to bypass a parental 
consent requirement is “entitled” to a confidential, anonymous, 
and swift proceeding in which she can show either “that she is 
mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion 
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her 
parents’ wishes,” or “that even if she is not able to make [that] 
decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her  
best interests.”8 
Alabama provides such a process, just like every other state, 
and this young woman availed herself of it. She sought relief from 
the appropriate government entity, explaining her reasons for 
wanting an abortion without her parents’ knowledge and offering 
factual support for her claim that she was sufficiently mature and 
informed to make this decision on her own. No one appeared in 
opposition, but the government nonetheless denied her request by 
issuing a “predrawn form” stating that she was “not mature and 
well informed enough to make the abortion decision” and that “the 
performance of the abortion is not in the best interest of the minor.”9 
Take three more short stories. First, in Illinois, the state 
legislature could not agree on how to redraw the state legislative 
district maps after the decennial census of 2000—just like it could 
not agree after the censuses of 1980 and 1990.10 Many states provide 
for a backup decisionmaker,11 so pursuant to Illinois law, the 
backup decisionmaker named one Republican and one Democrat 
and put those two names into a replica Lincoln stovepipe hat; the 
name that was selected was tasked with breaking the logjam.12 
 
 6. In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d 791, 791–92 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). 
 7. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). 
 8. Id. at 643–44. 
 9. In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d at 792. 
 10. Ray Long & Michelle Manchir, Illinois Democrats, Republicans Offer Dueling 
Redistricting Plans, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 26, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-
26/news/ct-met-illinois-redistricting-20100426_1_new-electoral-map-republicans-league-
of-women-voters. 
 11. See infra Section III.A. 
 12. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b). 
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Second, in New York, officials grew concerned that veterans 
struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain 
injuries were not well-served by the traditional criminal justice 
system—and that society was not particularly well-served by 
processing such offending veterans through that system.13 As in 
numerous other instances, those government officials established a 
Veterans Court with a specialized docket, staff, and services 
designed to better achieve justice and rehabilitation for those 
offenders.14 Third and finally, when the COVID-19 pandemic made 
holding the traditional in-person bar exam in the summer and fall 
of 2020 a risky public health event for aspiring lawyers and their 
families, government officials in some states decided to proceed 
with the exam anyway, some to postpone the exam, some to move 
it online, and others to offer various accommodations.15 
Despite the wide diversity of subject matter, the surprising yet 
common thread in all of these stories is that the government 
decisionmakers were state court judges. Nearly every state’s 
process for adult name changes runs, not through some records 
office, but through a low-level state court.16 So it was Judge Maurice 
Wahl of the New York City Civil Court who turned Mr. Jama 
away.17 Nearly every state’s process for parental bypass in the 
context of a minor seeking an abortion runs, not through the state’s 
department of children and family services, but through the same 
low-level state court.18 So it was a trial court judge who signed the 
form declaring the young woman insufficiently mature to seek an 
abortion without her parents’ involvement.19 Many states enlist 
state court judges or justices of the supreme court to assist in or to 
handle outright aspects of the legislative redistricting process,20 so 
it has thrice been the Illinois Supreme Court that put the names in 
 
 13. See Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1492, 1495 (2017). 
 14. See id. at 1492–98, 1520–22. 
 15. See July 2020 Bar Exam: Jurisdiction Information, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS 
(Sept. 1, 2020, 2:35 PM), http://www.ncbex.org/ncbe-covid-19-updates/july-2020-bar-exam-
jurisdiction-information. 
 16. See infra Section I.A. In Hawaii, this process runs through the Office of the 
Lieutenant Governor. HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-5(b). 
 17. In re Jama, 272 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966); see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 63 
(McKinney 2014). 
 18. See infra Section I.B. 
 19. See In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d 791, 791 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). 
 20. See infra Section III.A. 
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the stovepipe hat.21 Nearly all of the Veterans Courts—like a host 
of other specialized courts, for example, for drug treatment—have 
been established, not by state lawmakers, but by state court 
judges.22 And the decisions about whether and how to proceed with 
the bar exam during the pandemic were generally made, not by the 
states’ professional licensing bureaus, but by the high courts of the 
various states.23 
This Article explores, frames, and critiques this understudied 
and, indeed, largely unnoticed side of state court judging. To be 
sure, it has long been recognized that, in contrast to the federal 
government’s rigid, constitutionally rooted separation of powers, 
the states have taken a “varied, pragmatic approach in establishing 
governments” which often scrambles that traditional allocation.24 
But even so, we understand far too little about this simple fact of 
life in state courts: State court judges engage in decisionmaking in 
a whole host of non-adversarial settings outside of the traditional 
context of dispute resolution.25 
While scholars of criminal law have studied specialized courts 
and while scholars of abortion rights have studied the judicial 
bypass, for example, these disparate threads have not adequately 
been connected and used as a lens through which to better 
 
 21. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b). 
 22. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1492–98, 1520–22; infra Section III.B. 
 23. See, e.g., In re July 2020 Ala. Bar Examination, No. 19-20/118 (Ala. July 12, 2020); In 
re July 2020 Ind. Bar Examination, No. 20S-CB-300 (Ind. May 7, 2020); In re Petition for Waiver 
of the Bar Examination Requirement for Admission to the Bar and Provision of Emergency 
Diploma Privilege, No. S-20-0495 (Neb. July 13, 2020); In re July 2020 Nev. State Bar 
Examination, No. ADKT 0558 (Nev. May 20, 2020); In re Statewide Response by Wash. State 
Cts. to the Covid-19 Pub. Health Emergency, No. 25700-B-630 (Wash. June 12, 2020); see also 
NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, supra note 15. 
 24. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482–83 (1968) (quoting ROBERT C. WOOD, 
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 891–92 (1965)); see Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 
U.S. 71, 84 (1902); Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the 
Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 712, 717 (2018). 
 25. By claiming that judging tends to bring to mind this notion of adversarial dispute 
resolution, I simply mean to capture the common conception of what it is that judges do—
particularly federal judges. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S 219, 227 (1988) (referring to 
the “paradigmatic judicial acts” as those “involved in resolving disputes between parties 
who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court”); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (describing the key “characteristic of the judicial process” as “the adjudication of 
controversies between adversaries”); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial 
Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1357 
(2015) (emphasizing that our conception of federal courts is that they “serve as tribunals for 
the resolution of concrete disputes between adverse parties”). 
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understand the state judiciary. A truly full picture of the state 
judiciary must account for these unique, pervasive, and 
underappreciated functions. Indeed, it is only by seeing state courts 
for all that they are that scholars, citizens, advocates, and even 
judges themselves can best engage with them, assess their work, 
and contemplate how they might be designed and reformed so as 
to best respect the full range of values and rights at stake. 
And while too many articles to list have been written about how 
judges operate, what pressures and constraints are imposed on 
them, what incentives they face, how their decisions are reviewed, 
and what their place is in a system of government, those articles 
have largely investigated the traditional context of dispute 
resolution and, more importantly, have focused on federal judges.26 
But scholars have largely overlooked the need for a systematic 
understanding of state court judges beyond traditional judging—
that is, as distinct institutions of state government with an array of 
functions.27 And because states are not bound by the separation of 
 
 26. A significant literature examines the scope and constitutional propriety of the roles 
that federal judges play outside of or adjacent to dispute resolution. See, e.g., Pfander & Birk, 
supra note 25, at 1355 (reconciling such roles with Article III); Michael T. Morley, Consent of 
the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-
Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 640–44 (2014) (arguing that “consent decrees raise 
serious Article III concerns”); David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 
403, 410 (2019) (arguing in the multidistrict litigation context that “Article III 
courts . . . perform functions that are commonly thought to be the province of administrative 
agencies and executive departments”); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme 
Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 
(2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s role in setting civil procedure policy). Similar 
attention is warranted at the state level, and this Article contributes to filling that gap. 
 27. Cf. Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1034 
(2020) (“Despite the[] massive stakes . . . [and] the compelling human stories that unfold in 
these [state and local] courts, we know very little about them.”); Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica 
Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Marx, Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. 
REV. 249, 250, 265–72 (2018) (observing that “we know very little about our state courts” and 
offering possible explanations); Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 483, 488 (2017) (observing the “unique and understudied institutional context of 
states”); Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707, 
708–09 (2015) (noting the dearth of attention paid by scholars to local courts and to state trial 
courts); Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our Most 
Important Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 129 (2014) (same); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional 
Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 207–08 (1983) (“A major focus of the study of state 
constitutional law . . . should be on the nonadjudicatory functions of state supreme courts.”). 
Two important exceptions to the general scholarly inattention to state courts are 
Zachary Clopton’s study of the role that state courts play in the making of civil procedure 
rules in the states and Andrew Crespo’s evaluation of the role of state courts in making 
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powers constraints that exist at the federal level, they have the 
freedom to experiment with different allocations of roles. It is 
precisely that broad latitude, and its potential to be used in both 
beneficial and problematic ways, that cries out for closer attention. 
This Article answers that call. It begins by describing three 
categories of state court functions that go beyond the typical 
context of resolving adversarial disputes. First are quasi-
administrative roles like deciding name change applications, 
governing minors’ access to abortions, and admitting and 
disciplining attorneys. These are generally ex parte, and they 
involve a citizen seeking a statutorily offered benefit or license from 
his or her government by demonstrating that he or she satisfies 
certain stated criteria. The analogy to the perhaps more familiar 
federal level would be a person applying for disability benefits 
from the Social Security Administration.28 Second is the executive 
 
criminal procedure rules in the states. See Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, 
104 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2018) (noting that, while “state procedure-making has been 
understudied,” “state courts matter” and play varied roles in making civil procedure); 
Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1379–
88 (2018) (observing that state courts are “frequently the primary and supreme enactors of 
the procedural codes” regulating prosecutorial power). These complementary pieces each 
zero in on a specific function of state courts beyond dispute resolution—ones that, albeit with 
some departures, characterize the federal judiciary as well. See Clopton, supra, at 19 (“The 
broad strokes of state procedure-making have much in common with the federal system.”); 
Crespo, supra, at 1383–84 (noting that federal courts likewise make rules of criminal 
procedure but that, in many states, courts have the additional power to “override 
legislatively enacted statutes”). This Article, by contrast, takes a cross-cutting perspective on 
state court functions without analog in the federal judiciary. Moreover, Clopton and Crespo 
aim their attention outwards, looking to the implications of these rulemaking roles for civil 
and criminal litigation, while this Article looks inwards, leveraging that synthetic analysis to 
improve our understanding of the state courts themselves as institutions of government. 
Another exception is Helen Hershkoff’s work on justiciability in the state courts.  
See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,  
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001). Hershkoff makes tremendously important descriptive and 
normative claims about the doctrines governing access to state courts, see id. at 1838–41, but 
even the sustained attention she affords to the state courts likewise misses the functions 
beyond dispute resolution that this Article surfaces. That same focus on dispute resolution 
and litigation functions continues to animate more recent significant work about state and 
local courts. See, e.g., Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve 
Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS 128, 130–31 (2019) (focusing on dispute resolution but  
observing that even resolving disputes necessarily pulls state courts into broader 
socioeconomic problems like inequality, tenant insecurity, domestic violence, mental illness, 
drug abuse, and more); Carpenter et al., supra, at 254; Weinstein-Tull, supra, at 1042–45;  
Leib, supra, at 734. 
 28. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY BENEFITS (2019), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/ 
EN-05-10029.pdf. 
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law enforcement function of exercising discretion in choosing 
whether or not to prosecute someone. Third and finally are quasi-
legislative roles like redistricting and establishing specialized 
criminal courts. These involve enacting the law, setting the ground 
rules under which citizens interact with government, and, again, 
doing so outside of the context of dispute resolution. For each 
function and category, this Article documents significant variation 
in how the fifty states structure their courts’ roles, both to paint  
a more complete picture and, more importantly, to open our eyes 
to the spectrum of possible arrangements—and the good and bad 
in them. 
Of course, there are absolutely other state court functions that 
fall into these categories. These examples are simply meant to 
illustrate the three hats that state court judges wear in addition, to 
mix sartorial metaphors, to the traditional black robes of dispute 
resolution. Two other caveats are worth emphasizing at this point, 
too. First, this sorting is not meant to suggest that any sort of 
separation of powers principle is violated by allocating these tasks 
to judges; recall that states are not bound by the same bright lines 
by which the federal government is bound under the U.S. 
Constitution. Rather, this sorting is meant to capture the nature of 
the task at issue. Second, the lines between these categories are 
certainly far from bright and I do not mean to suggest otherwise. 
All of these tasks share some qualities, so these groupings are 
meant primarily to distinguish between likes and less-likes, to 
facilitate comparison both within contexts—where shared features 
often drive shared analysis—and across contexts, and to guide the 
normative evaluation at the heart of the Article. 
And that normative evaluation starts by recognizing that, more 
than being a mere curiosity of state law, these judicially allocated 
tasks carry great weight for the individuals and families in 
question. They also touch on rights and values of constitutional 
dimension. This nearly goes without saying in the context of 
minors’ access to abortion.29 But the impact does not stop there. 
When it comes to the regulation and discipline of attorneys, issues 
of privacy and due process may arise, and the practical import for 
 
 29. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Bellotti II,  
443 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1979). 
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the careers and finances of the attorneys themselves is substantial.30 
An adult’s desire to change his or her name may implicate 
significant First Amendment self-expression values, LGBT rights 
issues, and a host of dignitary and practical consequences for 
identification cards, voting rolls, school records, and the like.31 
Redistricting raises serious political association, equal protection, 
and voting rights concerns.32 And so on. 
With these substantial impacts in mind—and with the 
foundation that the nature of these tasks means they could all 
coherently be said to belong just as logically, if not more so, in some 
other decisionmaker’s wheelhouse—this Article turns to evaluate 
how they each ought to be understood and treated if one were 
writing on a clean slate. Drawing on the interests each task 
implicates, how much and what type of accountability we might 
want the decisionmaker to face, the breadth of the discretion we 
might want the decisionmaker to exercise in individual cases, and 
the need for expertise in each subject area, the Article assesses from 
an institutional design perspective what the architecture of 
decisionmaking ought to look like in each setting. This analysis 
embraces not only who the best decisionmaker might be, but what 
procedural constraints might be most appropriate for the 
decisionmaker in each setting. Should the interested individual be 
entitled to receive a decision supported by reasons rooted in the 
facts? Should the decisionmaker be bound to consider a set of 
externally defined criteria or should she have unfettered 
discretion?33 Should the decisionmaker be democratically 
 
 30. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Suspension of issued licenses thus 
involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the 
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“[Fundamental] 
liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”); In re Powell,  
945 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (name change application made by transgender 
person); In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002) (name change applications made by a 
same-sex couple). 
 32. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring); 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152–53 (1993); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,  
565–66 (1964). 
 33. To analogize to the federal level, for example, administrative agencies have to 
justify their decisions by reference to statutory criteria and reasons rooted in a record of 
evidence. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,  
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accountable? Should the individual be entitled to some form of 
appellate review of a negative decision? What standard of review 
ought to apply? 
For the law enforcement role studied here, this Article 
concludes that the state judiciary is indeed a fairly well-situated 
decisionmaker. Even though there is room to improve elements of 
the decisionmaking process, this conclusion puts this atypical facet 
of the state courts on a stronger theoretical footing. For the quasi-
legislative roles, this Article offers a more mixed verdict, justifying 
state redistricting practices while arguing that the state courts are 
decidedly second-best decisionmakers with respect to establishing 
specialized criminal courts. But for all of the quasi-administrative 
roles examined here, this Article contends that state courts are 
poorly situated to do the jobs demanded of them, at least as those 
jobs are often currently framed. It is therefore critical to change how 
state court judges are instructed to perform these tasks, the 
procedures they employ in doing so, and the manner in which their 
decisions are reviewed—both by other state courts and, in the 
attorney admission and discipline context in particular, by federal 
courts.34 Simply put, state court judges should, in these contexts, 
apply strict legislatively defined criteria and should act and be 
reviewed like other administrative decisionmakers making the 
same sorts of decisions. Failing that, these roles should be 
reassigned to other institutions better equipped to afford processes 
that respect the values at stake. 
To be sure, one might reach a different conclusion about the 
particular processes that are owed or appropriate in some or all of 
the contexts; taking a firm line on those details is not this Article’s 
ultimate aim. Rather, this Article endeavors to shine a light on the 
roles assigned to the state judiciary, to prompt a careful 
reevaluation of them, to provide a framework to structure that 
conversation, and to use that framework to generate a set of 
proposals that might improve these decisionmaking processes. But 
wherever this conversation leads, we must recognize the 
importance of the question, be open to finding that existing 
 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Judges, by contrast, do not, at least not when their decisions are being 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2017). 
 34. See infra Section IV.C.3 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in the well-
known federal jurisdiction case, D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), be 
overruled). 
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processes may fall short in some or all of these arenas, and be 
prepared either to offer process-based reforms within the judiciary 
or to conclude that another decisionmaker entirely is better situated 
to handle the task at issue. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first three endeavor to 
get a handle on the scope of state court judging as it departs from 
the traditional dispute-resolution paradigm. Together, they dive 
deep into six of the tasks assigned to state court judges. In so doing, 
they explore variation across the fifty states, not only for descriptive 
purposes, but in order to draw on the so-called “laboratories” of 
democracy to enable the evaluation of what is possible.35 That is, 
even once a state has chosen to entrust its judiciary with a particular 
task, it can choose to provide more or fewer or different fetters, or 
greater or lesser review, for that task. Understanding what has been 
done can inspire possible avenues for reform. Part I takes on three 
of the quasi-administrative tasks of the state court judge: deciding 
name change applications, governing minors’ access to abortions, 
and admitting and disciplining attorneys. Part II addresses the state 
court judge’s law enforcement power to decide whom to prosecute 
and whom not to prosecute. And Part III turns its sights on two 
newly salient quasi-legislative tasks of the state court judge: 
assisting with the redistricting process and establishing new 
criminal courts. Part IV then examines each from an institutional 
design perspective, comparing both within and across categories. 
Considering the interests each implicates, and the desirability of 
accountability, expertise, and discretion in each context, this final 
Part either defends the judge’s seemingly peculiar role or 
recommends a range of reforms. 
I. THE STATE JUDGE AS ADMINISTRATOR 
Suppose that you wanted to hold a parade down a town’s  
Main Street. Suppose further that you didn’t know anything 
specific about that town’s or that state’s law, but that you had some 
vague idea that such a thing would require some sort of permission 
 
 35. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
see Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1171 (1993) (“[T]he 
study of the structural features of state constitutions can enable us to consider alternative 
means of organizing representative democratic governments, assess the efficacy of different 
mechanisms for governing, and illuminate the implications and consequences of aspects of 
the federal government’s structure that we ordinarily take for granted.”). 
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from the government. Who would you go to in order to get 
permission to hold your parade? More likely than not, you would 
think that some government bureaucrat would be in charge of 
issuing or denying permits. You would probably expect there to be 
some Department of Parades that had responsibility for parade 
oversight, safety, and permission. In short, based on intuition if 
nothing else, you would expect there to be some kind of 
administrative agency charged with the parade portfolio. 
And you would be correct. In New York City, for example, the 
Street Activity Permit Office issues permits for festivals, block 
parties, farmers’ markets, and parades.36 In addition, depending on 
the type of parade, the event organizer may also need a permit from 
the city’s Police Department, Department of Transportation, and 
Department of Buildings, and the State Department of Health.37 The 
same is true—albeit on a smaller scale—even in small towns like 
Grand Marais, Minnesota.38 
Applications of this sort—in which a citizen seeks a statutorily 
offered benefit or license from his or her government by 
demonstrating ex parte that he or she satisfies certain stated 
criteria—are the bread and butter of administrative 
decisionmaking. But upon closer inspection, to apply for a number 
of state government permissions or benefits, one must turn, not to 
a state or local administrative agency, but to a state or local judge. 
When it comes to these arenas, then, these judges are effectively the 
administrators of the Department of Parades. 
Moreover, they serve this administrative function in a number 
of contexts, often not because of some careful legislative choice, but 
rather because, until relatively recently in the scale of the nation’s 
history, the courts were the only game in town—the only organ of 
the state government that existed in communities throughout the 
 
 36. NYC CITYWIDE EVENT COORDINATION & MGMT., Permit Types, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cecm/permitting/permit-types.page. 
 37. NYC CITYWIDE EVENT COORDINATION & MGMT., Supporting Permitting Agencies, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cecm/permitting/supporting-permitting-agencies.page 
 38. In Grand Marais, population 1,351, the Parks Office requires the completion  
of a special event permit application before one uses park space for special events.  
CITY OF GRAND MARAIS, MINNESOTA, https://www.ci.grand-marais.mn.us/;  
GRAND MARAIS RECREATION AREA, Grand Marais City Parks, 
https://www.grandmaraisrecreationarea.com/more-info. 
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state.39 With the maturation of the modern administrative state,  
it is past time to assess just what these functions are and to ask 
whether this vestige of history continues to make sense. 
A. Name Change Applications 
Much like hosting a parade, when a person wants to officially 
change his name, he must ask the government for permission. If he 
simply wants to assume the surname of his spouse, all he generally 
has to do is indicate as much on the couple’s marriage license and 
then inform other relevant federal and state agencies after the 
marriage.40 Marriage licenses are usually issued by state or local 
government agencies—in New York City, for example, the 
Marriage Bureau in the Office of the City Clerk does so—as a matter 
of course.41 Like getting a driver’s license—or a parade permit—all 
one needs to do is bring the necessary documentation, check off 
boxes on a form, and wait for a bureaucratic actor to affix a rubber 
stamp. This process is simple for the applicant and 
nondiscretionary for the government administrator. 
One might therefore assume that a similar process is implicated 
if a person wishes to change his or her first or middle name. Of 
course, one might replace the Marriage Bureau with the 
Department of Records or perhaps even the Department of Motor 
Vehicles, but what likely leaps to mind is a government agency of 
that sort. In forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, however, 
that would be wrong. 
 
 39. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,  
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 76 (1994) (noting that eighteenth-century courts “handled matters that 
today would be within the executive branch, not primarily because of some principled 
reason,” but because of the “administrative ease in relying upon the existing court 
structures”); see also Hershkoff, supra note 27, at 1871; Pfander & Birk, supra note 25, at 1412–
13; Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court: Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century 
Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 282–87 (1976); cf. Maureen E. Brady, The Forgotten 
History of Metes and Bounds, 128 YALE L.J. 872, 912 n.208 (2019) (noting that colonial judges 
“resolved disputes and serious criminal allegations but ‘combined judicial, legislative, and 
executive functions’”); Peterson, supra note 24, at 717 (showing “state judges in power-
sharing arrangements with their legislatures” throughout the early 1800s). The state courts’ 
role in attorney admission and discipline, however, has been the subject of more recent 
contestation and concerted choice. See infra notes 110–122 and accompanying text. 
 40. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of 
Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 817–19 (2007). 
 41. Marriage License, OFF. OF THE CITY CLERK, N.Y.C., https://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/ 
html/marriage/license.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
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In nearly every jurisdiction, a person who wants to officially 
change his or her name in circumstances other than a change  
of surname due to marriage must file a petition before a state  
court judge.42 This judge is often a probate judge, family court 
judge, general jurisdiction county judge, or some other non-
appellate judge.43 And as the following discussion illustrates, 
nearly all employ a functionally non-adversarial process: The judge 
will make the decision based entirely on the representations in the 
applicant’s petition in light of the rules (or lack thereof) imposed by 
state law. That petition generally must state the reasons for the 
desired change—either because state law requires as much,44 or 
because form petitions include a place for the applicant to provide 
reasons.45 Finally, once the judge reaches a decision, a dissatisfied 
applicant can appeal to a higher state court that will generally 
review the judge’s initial decision under a highly deferential “abuse 
of discretion” standard.46 
Beyond these commonalities, though, the states diverge into 
what we might call shall-issue jurisdictions, may-issue 
jurisdictions, and a grab bag of other approaches. Let us begin with 
the jurisdictions—running the gamut from blue to red, big to small, 
eastern to western, and everywhere in between—that use the 
seemingly discretion-limiting word “shall” in their name change 
statutes. About half of those provide that the judge shall grant the 
name change if there are no good reasons not to do so.47 Some of 
these leave it up to the judge to determine what those reasons might 
 
 42. I say “officially” because a person is generally permitted to “go by” any name he 
or she chooses as a matter of custom or informal social choice. I am therefore discussing here 
only the steps necessary to have one’s name changed as a matter of law and public record. 
The Hawaii exception is discussed infra p. 737. 
 43. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 1-701(1) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 547:3-i(I) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-49-10(A) (1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-25-101(a) (2013). 
 44. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-601(A) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-12-1(b) (2017); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402(a) (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.270 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN.  
§ 29-8-102 (1978). 
 45. Alabama, for example, offers a form requesting, among other things, “why you 
want to change your name.” ALA. STATE BAR, PS-12: REQUEST TO CHANGE NAME (FOR AN 
ADULT) (Aug. 2008), https://eforms.alacourt.gov/media/jtzbncuw/request-to-change-
name.pdf. 
 46. See, e.g., In re Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); In re Parrott, 392 
S.E.2d 48, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); In re Reed, 584 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);  
In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974). 
 47. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 12 (1977); MINN. STAT. § 259.11(a) (2005);  
OR. REV. STAT. § 33.410 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217(C) (2015). 
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be. For example, New York’s statute provides, “If the court to 
which the petition is presented is satisfied thereby, . . . that there is 
no reasonable objection to the change of name proposed, . . . the court 
shall make an order authorizing the petitioner to assume the name 
proposed.”48 Others of these go further and explicitly define what 
objections might be reasonable. Oklahoma’s statute, for example, 
says that “the prayer of the petition shall be granted unless the 
court or judge finds that the change is sought for an illegal or 
fraudulent purpose, or that a material allegation in the petition  
is false.”49 
But while the statutes in these states share a presumption that a 
requested change be granted unless the judge finds reasons not to 
grant it,50 the other half of the “shall-issue” jurisdictions flip the 
presumption: the name change shall be granted only if the judge 
finds good cause to do so.51 For example, Colorado’s statute states 
that a court in receipt of a petition for a name change “shall order 
the name change . . . if the court is satisfied that the desired change 
would be proper and not detrimental to the interests of any other 
person.”52 Likewise, the statute in Kansas provides that “[if] there 
is reasonable cause for changing the name of the petitioner the 
judge shall so order.”53 These states thus appear to place a burden 
of persuasion on the petitioner in a way that the states in the first 
group do not.54 
To be sure, practice sometimes matches statutory text and 
sometimes does not. When it does, courts either tightly enforce the 
limited grounds for denial in that state’s statute or embrace the 
statute’s broader latitude.55 When it does not, courts sometimes 
 
 48. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 63 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1634 (1953). 
 50. See In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579, 583 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2001) (“[T]he exercise of 
discretion to deny change of name is contrary to the common law and statutory policy in 
favor of granting such relief.”). 
 51. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 527.270 (1939); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,271(3) (2018);  
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-5 (1960); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-25-101 (2013). 
 52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-15-101(2)(a) (2016). 
 53. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402(c) (1990). 
 54. This is not to say that the burden is particularly weighty. For example, Kansas 
courts have indicated that “[t]he name change provisions do not require a demonstration of 
some compelling reason for the change,” but instead simply demand a showing of 
reasonable cause. In re Morehead, 706 P.2d 480, 481–82 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985). 
 55. See Libby Adler, T: Appending Transgender Equal Rights to Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Equal Rights, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 595, 614 n.80 (2010) (observing that, in New York, 
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conclude that, notwithstanding narrow statutory language, they 
have “inherent authority to deny” a name change petition if the 
chosen name is “racist, obscene, or otherwise likely to provoke 
violence, arouse passions, or inflame hatred,” even though none of 
those conditions are present in the state’s statute.56 Or they 
conclude, even in the face of fairly open-ended language, that there 
are “very limited bases for denying a statutory name change 
application” and that “policy-based or philosophical objections to 
individual name changes” are not proper grounds for denial.57 
These ambiguities in application would matter more if one were 
trying to strictly categorize the states. They matter less for present 
purposes, which are instead to get a handle on the categories of 
existing approaches. 
Putting these “shall-issue” states to the side, we can turn to the 
jurisdictions that use the more discretionary word “may” in their 
statutes. About half of these leave matters entirely open-ended and 
simply provide that the judge “may” grant the name change, full 
stop.58 For example, Indiana provides that the courts “may change 
the names of natural persons on application by petition,”59 and its 
supreme court has explicitly held that “[t]here is no statutory 
requirement in Indiana that the petitioner establish any particular 
reason other than his personal desire for [a] change of name.”60  
A handful go a step further and provide that the judge “may” grant 
 
“the judicial procedure vests significant discretion in judges to limit access to name 
changes”). Compare In re Harvey, 293 P.3d 224, 225 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (reversing a trial 
court’s denial of a name change petition filed by a transgender person, in a state with a 
narrow-discretion statute, because the statute provides that the only permissible bases for 
such a denial are fraud or illegality, neither of which is present when one simply wishes to 
“identify[] oneself by a traditionally male or female name while having the DNA of the other 
sex”), with In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *3 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) 
(rejecting a petition to change one’s name to “Steffi Owned Slave” in a state that does  
not tightly define what makes an application unreasonable because the judge feared  
that granting the petition would “attach the imprimatur of the court to that individual’s 
political philosophy”). 
 56. In re Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Minn. 1979). 
 57. In re Zhan, 37 A.3d 521, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-11(a) (2014); KY. REV. STAT. § 401.010 (2013);  
N.H. REV. STAT. § 547:3-i(I) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-104 (1978). Maine adds a slight 
twist, providing that a judge “may not” change a person’s name if the judge concludes that 
the person’s motives are “contrary to the public interest.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C,  
§ 1-701(6) (2020). 
 59. IND. CODE § 34-28-2-1 (2017). 
 60. In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 859 (Ind. 1974). 
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the change upon a showing by the applicant of good cause.61  
And another handful provide that the judge “may” grant the 
change if there is no good reason not to do so.62 
Finally, there are the states that do not fit neatly in either the 
shall-issue or may-issue camps. Most still place judges at the center 
of the process, though. Two states grant judges authority to decide 
whether a name change application should be granted but defy 
easy categorization.63 Another state provides that a judge “may” 
change a person’s name, but its statute also lists a narrow set of 
specific criteria the judge “shall” consider.64 A few states are silent 
as to how the judge’s authority should be exercised.65 And in 
Louisiana, the judge has the discretion to render a decision on a 
name change application as she sees fit,66 but the process is actually 
adversarial—the statute provides that the proceedings “shall be 
carried on contradictorily with the district attorney,” whose role is 
to “represent the state” and who “shall be served with a copy of the 
petition and citation to answer the same.”67 Finally, on the other 
end of the spectrum, in Vermont, an applicant must appear before 
a judge, but simply to sign a form before the judge which “shall” 
thereafter be filed.68 The judge is given no power to deny  
the application. 
 
 61. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2503(a) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 711.1(1) (2020); OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2717.01(A)(3) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (1953); W. VA. CODE  
§ 48-25-103(a) (2007). Here, too, some state courts interpret these statutes more strictly than 
the wording may suggest. See, e.g., In re Porter, 31 P.3d 519, 521 (Utah 2001) (ordering trial 
court to grant a name change to Santa Claus and holding that applications under the state’s 
“may”-issue statute should “generally be granted unless sought for a wrongful or fraudulent 
purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 5904(a) (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101(d) 
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-1 (1989); WIS. STAT. § 786.36(1) (2018). 
 63. See S.C. CODE § 15-49-20(C) (2006) (“[T]he judge must determine and grant or 
refuse the name change as the judge considers proper, having a due regard to the true 
interest of the petitioner and protection of the public.”). Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.010 
(1986) (providing that a name change “may not be made unless the court finds sufficient 
reasons for the change and also finds it consistent with the public interest”), with ALASKA R. 
CIV. P. 84(c) (2014) (“If satisfied that there is no reasonable objection to the assumption of 
another name by petitioner, the court shall by judgment authorize petitioner to assume such 
other name”). 
 64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-601(A), (C) (2011). 
 65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07 (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-22-28 (1991). 
 66. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4753 (2019). 
 67. Id. § 13:4752. 
 68. VT. STAT. tit. 15, § 811 (2011). 
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One state keeps the power in the courts but shifts it away from 
the judge. In North Carolina, the clerk of the court—not the judge 
herself—is designated as the initial recipient of a name change 
application, and the clerk has the “duty” not to grant the application 
if he finds that good reasons exist for denying it.69 The clerk must, 
however, afford the applicant with reasons for a denial, at which 
point the applicant may appeal the clerk’s decision to the local 
judge, whose decision on the matter is “final” and not appealable 
any further.70 
Finally, in Hawaii, the power resides entirely outside the courts. 
There, a person who wishes to change his name must petition the 
Office of the Lieutenant Governor.71 The Lieutenant Governor has 
promulgated regulations setting out the information an applicant 
must provide—including the reasons for the requested change—
and allowing for the possibility that the Lieutenant Governor will 
deny the petition.72 Those regulations, however, are silent about the 
bases on which such a denial may be grounded and about the 
breadth of discretion available on that score. Rather, they simply 
state that a denial will be accompanied by reasons and that an 
unsuccessful applicant has the right to seek rehearing.73 
B. Minors’ Access to Abortion 
Of the forty-three states with statutes on the books that require 
parental involvement—either consent or notification—in a minor’s 
decision to seek an abortion, forty-two provide for that parental 
involvement to be “bypassed” if a particular governmental actor 
approves of the decision being made without the requisite parental 
involvement.74 Just as with name changes, if one did not know 
 
 69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 101-2(a), 101-5(f) (2014–15). 
 70. Id. § 101-5(f). The statute also provides that an unsuccessful applicant is not 
permitted to reapply for another year, id., and that a successful applicant is not permitted to 
reapply for another name change ever again. Id. § 101-6(a) (“No person shall be allowed to 
change his name under this Chapter but once . . . .”). 
 71. HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-5(a)(1), (b) (2014). That Office provides a simple online 
portal and instructional video to guide applicants through the process. See Name Change 
Application, LT. GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF HAW.: JOSH GREEN, https://namechange.ehawaii 
.gov/public/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
 72. HAW. CODE R. §§ 2-2-2, 2-2-6 (1987). 
 73. Id. § 2-2-6. 
 74. Maryland law provides that a physician may perform an abortion on a minor 
without notice to the minor’s parent if, in the physician’s judgment, (a) notice “may lead to 
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better, one might think this government actor would be an 
administrator from, say, the state’s health department or child and 
family welfare department. The thing being sought by the minor is, 
after all, akin to a permit. But, just as with name changes, the 
statutorily authorized government actor here is uniformly a state 
court judge. 
This regime of parental involvement coupled with judge-
controlled bypass is best reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 
decision in Bellotti v. Baird. In that case, a challenge to a 
Massachusetts abortion regulation statute, the Court held that a 
state can permissibly make a minor’s decision to seek an abortion 
contingent on her parent’s consent. However, the Court held that if 
a state does so, it “also must provide an alternative procedure 
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”75 
Specifically, a minor seeking to bypass a parental consent 
requirement is “entitled” to a confidential, anonymous, and swift 
proceeding in which she can show either “that she is mature 
enough and well enough informed to make her abortion  
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her 
parents’ wishes,” or “that even if she is not able to make [that] 
decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her  
best interests.”76 
While the Court thus made explicit that a minor is entitled to an 
opportunity to convince the state government to waive the parental 
consent that would otherwise be required, and while it set out the 
standards to which a state can permissibly hold a minor attempting 
to make that showing, it did not say which component of state 
government must serve as the decisionmaker. Because 
Massachusetts law already involved state superior court judges in 
minors’ abortion decisions—albeit in ways the Court ultimately 
found to inadequately safeguard a pregnant minor’s rights—the 
Court framed this bypass procedure by reference to a proceeding 
 
physical or emotional abuse of the minor,” (b) the minor is “mature and capable of giving 
informed consent to an abortion,” or (c) notice would not be in the minor’s “best interest.” 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103(c)(1) (1991). The jurisdictions that do not require any 
form of parental involvement are Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,  
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See Reprod. Health Servs. v. 
Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1284–85 n.17 (M.D. Ala. 2017). 
 75. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). 
 76. Id. at 643–44. 
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before a judge.77 The Court made clear, however, “that a State 
choosing to require parental consent” is entitled to “delegate the 
alternative procedure to a juvenile court or an administrative 
agency or officer.”78 In fact, the Court recognized that it could be 
beneficial if a state were to “employ[] procedures and a forum less 
formal than those associated with a court of general jurisdiction.”79 
Nearly every state has nonetheless chosen to entrust this 
procedure to its judges, and everywhere but Alabama, the 
proceedings are structured in approximately the same way.80 
Rather than fill out a form and meet with a counselor at the state’s 
health department, a minor wishing to pursue an abortion without 
the notification or consent of her parent must take the “daunting” 
and “intimidating” step of filing a petition with a state court judge 
that sets out her desire to bypass her parents.81 The petition is filed 
anonymously or pseudonymously,82 and minors are to be informed 
that they have the right to court-appointed counsel (and sometimes 
guardians ad litem as well) upon request.83 The petition will be 
 
 77. Id. at 643 n.22. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. While a number of states require parental consent to a minor’s abortion, see, for 
example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152(A) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(a) (2014); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:1061.14(A) (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31(A) (1990), some require only parental 
notification, see, for example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(1) (1995); MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2) 
(2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255(1) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.85(A) (2013). But this 
distinction has no apparent effect on the ways in which states structure their bypass 
proceedings. Moreover, while the Supreme Court has “not decided whether parental notice 
statutes must contain” the same bypass opportunities that parental consent statutes do, Ohio 
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990), every state in this category in fact 
provides an opportunity for bypass of a notification requirement. See Reprod. Health Servs. 
v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1285 n.18 (M.D. Ala. 2017). 
 81. Kate Coleman-Minahan, Amanda Jean Stevenson, Emily Obront & Susan Hays, 
Young Women’s Experiences Obtaining Judicial Bypass for Abortion in Texas, 64 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 20 (2019); Molly Redden, This is How Judges Humiliate Pregnant Teens Who Want 
Abortions, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10 
/teen-abortion-judicial-bypass-parental-notification/ (“‘“Daunting” doesn’t begin to cover 
it,’ says Jennifer Dalven, who runs the reproductive rights arm of the American Civil 
Liberties Union. ‘Imagine it: You’re 17 years old. You’re already struggling with this 
unplanned pregnancy. You may be afraid of your parents. And now you’re told,  
“Go to court”?’”). 
 82. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(c) (2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.14(B)(3)(a) 
(2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3) (2007). 
 83. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-809(b)(1)(B), (C) (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 132:34(II)(a) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(B) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN.  
§ 37-10-304(c)(1) (2020). 
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considered and ruled upon by the judge ex parte within a 
statutorily set and very short period of time (typically a few days  
at most), and if the judge fails to do so, the petition is often  
deemed granted.84 If the judge wishes to hold a hearing before 
issuing a decision, the minor is entitled to appear at that hearing in 
a closed setting and with her attorney.85 With specific allowances 
for the time-sensitive and confidentiality-sensitive context, then, 
this structure is similar to that which attends a name change request 
in that both involve the judge acting as the decisionmaker on a one-
sided petition that is entirely removed from any pending or 
imminent litigation. 
But whereas many state court judges enjoy fairly wide 
discretion with respect to name change requests, their discretion 
tends to be somewhat more cabined in this context—at least 
formally, according to the terms of the relevant statutes. When it 
comes to the judge’s decisionmaking authority to bypass parental 
involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, many of the states 
instruct their judges in similar fashions. Echoing the language of 
Bellotti, these states provide—to take Colorado as an example—that 
“any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction shall” order that the 
requisite parental involvement be waived “if the judge determines 
that [such involvement] will not be in the best interest of the minor, 
or if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
minor is sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an 
abortion.”86 That is, the factors to be considered are explicit, as is 
the judge’s duty to grant. Further, mirroring the reason-giving 
requirements and demands for supporting evidence that are the 
bread and butter of administrative law,87 nearly all of these states 
 
 84. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1784(c) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-683 (2014); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/25(c) (1995). 
 85. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 135L.3(3)(c) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(c) (2014);  
ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1597-A(6)(C) (2020). 
 86. COLO. REV. STAT. §13-22-707(1)(a) (2018); see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-684(c) 
(2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(3)(e) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(4) (2007);  
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(e) (2020). 
 87. See, e.g., T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 819 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“One such [administrative law] principle, as the Court explains, is the 
requirement that agencies give reasons.”); 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(A) (“All decisions, including 
initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a 
statement of findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material 
issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT.  
§ 24-4-104(8), (10) (2018) (requiring any state agency making a decision to deny, revoke, or 
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go on to require the judge to include in the order “specific factual 
findings and legal conclusions in support thereof.”88 
For the remaining states, this statutory structuring of the 
judges’ decisionmaking is even more involved. Rather than just set 
out a standard that judges must find a minor to satisfy in order to 
be freed from the applicable parental involvement requirement, 
these legislatures have listed specific factors that the judge must 
consider. In Florida, for example, a judge is required to consider the 
minor’s age, intelligence, “emotional development and stability,” 
“credibility and demeanor as a witness,” “ability to accept 
responsibility,” “ability to assess both the immediate and long-
range consequences of the minor’s choices,” and “ability to 
understand and explain the medical risks of terminating her 
pregnancy and to apply that understanding to her decision.”89 The 
judge is also required to consider “[w]hether there may be any 
undue influence by another on the minor’s decision to have an 
abortion.”90 The other states in this category have statutes which 
largely mirror that language.91 But in Kansas, which imposes the 
most elaborate instructions, the judge “shall take into account the 
minor’s experience level, perspective and judgment,” along with 
her “age, experience working outside the home, living away from 
home, traveling on her own, handling personal finances, and 
making other significant decisions.”92 And in so doing, the judge 
“shall consider . . . what steps the minor has taken to explore her 
options and the extent to which she considered and weighed the 
potential consequences of each option,” “[the minor’s] conduct 
since learning of her pregnancy,” and “her intellectual ability to 
understand her options and to make informed decisions.”93 
 
suspend a license to provide written notice along with “the grounds therefor”);  
id. § 24-4-105(14)(a) (requiring agency decisions be rooted in a factual record). 
 88. COLO. REV. STAT. §13-22-707(1)(a) (2018); see also IOWA CODE § 135L.3(3)(f) (2015); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(5) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(f) (2020). 
 89. FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c)(1) (2020). 
 90. Id. § 390.01114(4)(c)(2). 
 91. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(e) (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.028(2)(2) 
(2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(f)(4) (1992). A few other states list factors that a judge “may” 
consider. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152(C) (2014). And Oklahoma actually forbids a 
judge from considering “the potential financial impact on the pregnant unemancipated 
minor or the family of the pregnant unemancipated minor if she does not have an abortion.” 
63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-740.3(A) (2013). 
 92. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(n) (2014). 
 93. Id. 
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Finally, Alabama employs a notably distinct procedure.94 
Unlike all the other states,95 the court is required upon receipt of a 
minor’s petition to “immediately notify the district attorney’s office 
of the county in which the minor is a resident, or the county where 
the petition was filed of the filing of the petition on the day of such 
filing” so that the district attorney “shall participate as an advocate 
for the state to examine the petitioner and any witnesses, and to 
present evidence for the purpose of providing the court with a 
sufficient record upon which to make an informed decision and to 
do substantial justice.”96 Alabama is thus the only state in the nation 
in which these proceedings are not ex parte. Moreover, the court is 
also permitted by statute to appoint a guardian ad litem, not merely 
for the minor petitioner, but “for the interests of the unborn child,” 
and that guardian ad litem “shall have the same rights and 
obligations of participation in the proceeding as given to the district 
attorney’s office.”97 And while the minor’s parents are not to be 
contacted by the court—for that would defeat the purpose of the 
hearing’s confidential nature98—the statute provides that, if the 
minor’s parents are already aware of the proceeding, they “shall be 
given notice of and be permitted to participate” in the proceeding 
“with all of the rights and obligations of any party to the 
proceeding.”99 And finally, any party in the proceeding—which 
can include the district attorney, the guardian ad litem for the fetus, 
and the minor’s parents—can request and receive a delay in the 
proceedings for up to one business day, “unless justice requires an 
extension thereof.”100 
Whatever the merits or demerits of Alabama’s unique 
framework—and many of the components highlighted above have 
 
 94. It does not appear that Alabama’s recently enacted near-ban on abortion amends 
the procedure applicable to minors seeking abortions, though its existence dramatically 
changes the landscape for those young women. See H.B. 314 § 4 (Ala. 2019) (criminalizing 
abortion except where “necessary in order to prevent a serious health risk to the unborn 
child’s mother”). 
 95. See Reprod. Health Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1284 (M.D. Ala. 2017) 
(observing that Alabama’s framework is matched by “no other state”). 
 96. ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(i) (2014). 
 97. Id. § 26-21-4(j). 
 98. Id. § 26-21-4(c), (o). 
 99. Id. §26-21-4(l). 
 100. Id. § 26-21-4(k). 
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been permanently enjoined by a district court101—that framework 
comes closest to putting state court judges in an ordinary judicial 
capacity resolving adversarial disputes. It therefore serves to 
illustrate how different the judge’s role in this arena is in every 
other state.  
C. Attorney Admission and Discipline 
The entrance to many professions—some argue too many102—
is regulated by state law. People wishing to engage in those 
occupations must receive licenses from the state to do so. For all but 
one of those professions, the licensing entity is an administrative 
agency of the state government. In New York, for example, the 
Division of Licensing Services of the Department of State boasts on 
its website that it regulates “35 occupations throughout the state” 
and “licenses over 800,000 individuals and businesses.”103 These 
occupations range from cosmetology to home inspection, barbering 
to hearing aid dispensing, pet cremation to coin processing, and 
waxing to ticket reselling.104 Other professions in New York—like 
doctors and dentists—are regulated by their own state 
administrative agencies.105 The same is true across the country, 
whether the subject is the practice of dentistry regulated by the 
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners,106 one of the over 
forty professions regulated by the Texas Department of Licensing 
 
 101. See Reprod. Health Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1296–97 (M.D. Ala. 
2017). The court did not, however, reach the plaintiffs’ argument that any adversarial 
procedure would necessarily be unconstitutional. Id. at 1286 n.19, 1295 n.24. But see Zbaraz 
v. Hartigan, 776 F. Supp. 375, 382–84 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (concluding that the Court in Bellotti II 
“did not contemplate that [a bypass] procedure would be . . . adversarial” and enjoining a 
rule that would have allowed “[a]ny respondent that desires to do so” to file a response to 
the minor’s petition). 
 102. See, e.g., Economic Liberty, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/pillar/economic-
liberty/?post_type=case (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) (cataloging litigation aimed at reducing 
government regulation of occupations). 
 103. Department of State, Division of Licensing Services, N.Y. STATE, 
https://www.dos.ny.gov/licensing/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Office of Professional Medical Conduct, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
https://www.health.ny.gov/professionals/doctors/conduct/ (last visited Sept. 10, 
2020) (regulating doctors); Office of the Professions, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, 
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/dent/dentlic.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) 
(regulating dentists). 
 106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(b) (1981). 
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and Regulation,107 one of the fields of medicine regulated by the 
Florida Department of Health’s Board of Medicine,108 or one of the 
many hair, skin, and nail beautification occupations regulated by 
the Iowa Board of Cosmetology Arts & Sciences.109 
The exception is attorneys. In every state, the admission and 
discipline of attorneys is governed, not by some Department of 
Attorney Licensing, but by the state courts.110 In some states, this 
responsibility and this power are allocated to the state courts in the 
constitution;111 in others, by statute;112 and in others by judicial 
decision.113 No matter the basis, the rationales have been the 
same.114 First and foremost, lawyers are “officers” of the court. And 
whether this entails something akin to a principal-agent frame in 
which the court’s need to control its “officers” means that it must be 
the entity which regulates admission into the practice,115 or whether 
it means that considerations of efficiency or expertise suggest the 
 
 107. Programs Licensed and Regulated by TDLR, TEX. DEP’T OF LICENSING & REGUL., 
https://www.tdlr.texas.gov/licenses.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2020). 
 108.  Licensing and Registration, FLA. BD. OF MED., https://flboardofmedicine.gov 
/licensing/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) (regulating medical professions). 
 109. Board of Cosmetology Arts & Sciences, IOWA DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, 
https://idph.iowa.gov/Licensure/Iowa-Board-of-Cosmetology-Arts-and-Sciences  
(last visited Sept. 10, 2020); see also IOWA CODE § 157.1(5), (6) (2015) (listing covered practices). 
 110. See Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United 
States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 933 (1994); Michael C. Dorf, Disbarment in the United States: 
Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 8 (1975). The regulation of 
attorney admission by state court judges received recent and sustained public attention—
and, in many corners, criticism—as these judges were frequently the officials to make 
decisions about the administration of the bar exam for aspiring attorneys amidst the COVID-
19 pandemic. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 111. E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2 cl. 3; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 4; ARK. CONST. amend. 28. 
 112. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 13 (1939); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.021 (1987); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 36-2-1 (1941); D.C. CODE § 11-2501 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.910 (2020). 
 113. E.g., State v. Cook, 525 P.2d 761, 763–64 (Wash. 1974). 
 114. In the earliest days of the United States, the practice of law was inconsistently if 
ever regulated. See Dorf, supra note 110, at 6; Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the 
Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 531–32 (1983). 
But by the late-1800s, state courts began to regulate it. See Dorf, supra note 110, at 6–8. 
 115. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378–79 (1866); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) 
(Cardozo, C.J.); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325, 330 (Utah 1943); see also Hershkoff, 
supra note 27, at 1873–74 (discussing state courts which claim the regulation of the bar to be 
“an inherent aspect of their institutional role”). 
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court ought to be that entity which does so,116 courts have long since 
reached the conclusion that they have the “exclusive[]” power to 
admit and discipline attorneys.117 Second, the courts’ power to 
license lawyers is often justified by the claim that only the courts 
can adequately preserve the independence of lawyers and the legal 
profession from undue regulation or pressure from the more 
political branches of government, particularly the legislature.118 
Indeed, the American Bar Association even suggests that the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution all but requires that courts be 
the entities to license lawyers.119 
Of course, these claims are contestable. For one thing, at the 
same time as the courts were articulating this vision of their 
inherent power to govern admission to the bar, much of the practice 
of law was moving “out of the courtroom and into the law office.”120 
The claim that attorneys are notionally officers of the court is thus 
a thin reed on which to rest such a sweeping argument when one 
considers that many lawyers will never interact with a judge in 
their entire careers. But they are all but guaranteed to interact with 
clients, and critics charge that courts are not necessarily best 
situated to regulate in the interests of those clients.121 Rather, they 
say, it is the coordinate branches of government—contrary to the 
 
 116. See, e.g., Karlin, 162 N.E. at 493 (“[If] the house is to be cleaned, it is for those who 
occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the noisome work.”); In re Integration 
of Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (Neb. 1937) (“The practice of law is so intimately 
connected and bound up with the exercise of judicial power and the administration of justice 
that the right to define and regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs in the judicial 
department of our state government.”). 
 117. Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1857). Of course, as noted above, this 
statement and its claim to historical practice were questionable in 1857. See supra note 114; 
Alpert, supra note 114, at 535 (observing that this statement in Secombe about “well-settled 
judicial power” is “misleading history”). 
 118. See Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_arc
hive/mckay_report/ (“From the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the McCarthy era of the 
1950s, history has shown that the people’s respect for individual rights can sink dangerously 
low. Legislatures act accordingly. During such times, an independent judiciary and legal 
profession are necessary to protect those rights.”). 
 119. Id. (invoking the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as “another reason 
why the judiciary must regulate the legal profession”). 
 120. Alpert, supra note 114, at 546; see also id. at 543 (discussing efforts by state 
legislatures to recapture authority over the bar). 
 121. See id. at 548 (observing that critics “regard the interests of the client, who is the 
consumer of legal services, as paramount to those of the professional” and noting that such 
critics “did not trust lawyers to clean their own house”). 
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ABA’s drumbeat—that are best situated to protect people from 
predatory or unscrupulous lawyers. In other words, perhaps the 
bar could stand to have its independence threatened a bit.122 
But even setting that aside for the moment, none of the courts’ 
or the ABA’s arguments suggest that the nature of licensing and 
discipline is—just as with any other licensed profession—anything 
other than fundamentally administrative in nature. Indeed, it is 
precisely because these tasks are qualitatively administrative that it 
is even plausible to explore or suggest reallocating them away from 
the state courts and into the same sorts of entities that regulate other 
professions. That is, no one would suggest—perhaps least of all the 
ABA—that the Iowa Board of Cosmetology Arts & Sciences serves 
a traditionally judicial function when it decides whether to grant an 
applicant a license to style hair.123 The courts’ insistence that the 
practice of law is special does not make it so. 
To be sure, the practice of law might be special. The courts 
might be right that it makes sense to assign the role of attorney 
regulation to those courts. But that conclusion cannot rest on vague 
appeals to lawyers’ status as officers of the court or on the asserted 
need for independence—which the argument suggests no other 
profession deserves. Rather, it must rest on an analysis of the 
interests at stake, the processes owed to protect those interests, and 
the institutions best equipped to offer those processes. As with the 
other quasi-administrative tasks explored in this Part, the final Part 
takes up that charge. 
II. THE STATE JUDGE AS ENFORCER 
State court judges play another executive role distinct from the 
quasi-administrative functions discussed in Part I. They exercise 
enforcement discretion in precisely the area which the popular 
conception perhaps most associates with the executive: the choice 
whether to prosecute an individual. Specifically, a number of states 
afford their judges the power to dismiss charges on the judge’s own 
initiative and based on the judge’s own belief that it was a mistake 
 
 122. See id. at 554–56 (discussing arguments in favor of transferring the power over the 
legal profession to state legislatures, noting that legislatures might be helpfully “less 
sympathetic toward the bar than are the courts,” and pointing out that questions of how best 
to regulate lawyers “are political and should be viewed as such”). 
 123. See infra Section IV.C.3 (discussing and criticizing D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
460 U.S. 462 (1983)). 
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for the prosecutor to have commenced those charges in the  
first place. 
In the common conception, prosecutors choose whether to file 
charges, which charges to file, and what penalties to seek. State 
court judges preside over the ensuing criminal trials (or accept 
pleas in the vastly more common circumstance124) and sentence 
convicted individuals. That is, common law criminal justice 
systems like the ones throughout the United States familiarly place 
the judge in the role of arbiter with respect to charges that are filed 
by an actor independent of the court, namely the local district 
attorney or state attorney general. And that actor performs a 
qualitatively executive law enforcement function: she enforces the 
criminal law.125 As Justice Scalia put it, the power to investigate and 
prosecute “has always and everywhere—if conducted by 
government at all—been conducted never by the legislature, never 
by the courts, and always by the executive.”126 And the power to 
refrain from prosecuting likewise “has long been regarded as the 
special province of the Executive Branch.”127 On the same logic, the 
power to terminate a prosecution once it has begun was also 
historically the province of the prosecutor herself. Indeed, at 
common law, it was only the prosecutor who could enter the writ 
of nolle prosequi and voluntarily dismiss a prosecution.128 
But in nineteen states, judges in the trial courts have the explicit 
law enforcement power to unilaterally dismiss prosecutions on the 
judge’s own initiative.129 The judges in these states are not 
 
 124. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (noting that 97% of federal 
convictions and 94% of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas, and then concluding 
that “plea bargaining . . . is the criminal justice system” (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))). 
 125. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (“There is no real dispute that the 
[investigative and prosecutorial] functions performed by the independent counsel are 
‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically have been 
undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.”); id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially  
executive function.”). 
 126. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 127. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 128. Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the 
Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 846 (1999) (“Seen from an 
historical point of view, then, the writ appears to have been lodged solely in the hands of  
the prosecutor . . . .”). 
 129. Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2017). 
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evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, but are instead making 
normative judgments about whether a case ought to be pursued 
even if there is ample evidence of guilt—and concluding that it 
ought not be.130 
In the majority of these states, the judge’s power is capaciously 
framed as the power to dismiss prosecutions “in furtherance of 
justice.”131 Nearly all of them leave this determination to the judge’s 
open-ended discretion and permit the judge to make that 
determination on her own motion; some even forbid the defendant 
from invoking the judicial dismissal statute and asking the judge to 
exercise her discretion in this manner.132 New York was the first 
state to give judges this power,133 and it imposed some bounds on 
the judge’s discretion by requiring her to consider ten specific 
factors before concluding that a dismissal is warranted.134 The 
states that followed, however, have opted not to do so. Instead, they 
simply require the judge to place on the record her reasons, 
whatever they are, for ordering the dismissal.135  
A small minority of the states with judicial dismissal statutes 
instead permit the judge to dismiss a prosecution if the judge 
concludes that the defendant’s conduct was relatively unimportant 
or “too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.”136 This 
can be the case with respect to any crime; even defendants accused 
of serious crimes can see their charges dismissed by a state court 
judge pursuant to this sort of statute.137 These “de minimis” 
dismissal statutes, while shaped slightly differently, still mirror the 
more open-ended dismissal statutes in the power they afford to 
 
 130. See People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 420 (N.Y. 1983) (noting that the purpose of 
this power is, “even to the disregard of legal or factual merit, . . . ‘to allow the letter of the 
law gracefully and charitably to succumb to the spirit of justice’”). 
 131. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.21 (West 2017); see also Roberts, supra note 129, at 332, 333 
n.21 (collecting statutes). 
 132. Roberts, supra note 129, at 352 n.158. 
 133. Id. at 333–34. 
 134. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.40 (misdemeanors), 210.40 (felonies). 
 135. See Valena E. Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629, 
656 (2015). 
 136. HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236(1)(b) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 12(1)(b) 
(2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11(b) (West 2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312(a)(2) (2020); 
see Roberts, supra note 129, at 334–35 (discussing same). 
 137. See State v. Zarrilli, 523 A.2d 284, 287 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (“The de 
minimis statute applies to all prohibited conduct.”); Roberts, supra note 129, at 336. 
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judges with respect to the management and continuation of charges 
against defendants in their courtrooms. 
Across all of these states, the allocation of this power to the state 
judiciary reflects a conscious choice to vest judges with an 
enforcement power typically wielded by executive officials. 
Indeed, when New York adopted its judicial dismissal statute, it 
was motivated to do so specifically in order to weaken the 
prosecutor’s enforcement discretion and distribute it to the 
courts.138 The New York legislature found it problematic that the 
judge was “unable, no matter how unjust may be the continuance 
of the indictment against the defendant, to relieve him from that 
injustice, until the district attorney chooses to consent that it do 
so.”139 Other states went on to frame the power as one that the 
prosecutors and the judges would exercise in “parallel.”140 And 
judges, for their parts, have gotten the message. As Anna Roberts 
has explained, judges tend to justify their decisions to dismiss 
prosecutions by reference to their conclusion that the prosecutor 
made a “wrong” choice based on the defendant’s mitigating 
circumstances, or that the prosecutor’s resources could have been 
better used focusing on other defendants or other crimes, or that 
the prosecutor has over-charged or otherwise been unduly harsh 
towards a given individual.141 All of these necessarily entail 
replacing the prosecutor’s enforcement discretion with the judge’s.142 
This concern on the part of judges that other actors in the 
criminal justice system (here, prosecutors) are doing their jobs 
incorrectly—or, indeed, that the criminal justice system is 
altogether broken—might well be a valid one, and the judges’ 
 
 138. People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 423 (N.Y. 1983) (“[O]ne of the reforms effected 
through the years in the procedure to dismiss accusatory instruments in the interest of justice 
was to remove the power to do so from the offices of District Attorney and Attorney-General 
and lodge it, instead, in the courts alone.”). 
 139. Roberts, supra note 129, at 334 (citing COMM’RS ON PRAC. & PLEADING, REPORT ON 
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 343 (1850), 
https://ia800202.us.archive.org/13/items/codecriminalpro00pleagoog/codecriminalpro0
0pleagoog.pdf). 
 140. Id. at 335–36. 
 141. Id. at 340–44 (collecting cases). 
 142. See id. (noting that, while “[p]rosecutors can decline to charge” or can move to 
dismiss charges, judges are frustrated by the culture in prosecutors’ offices that minimizes 
the exercise of this power and so step in to exercise it themselves); id. at 366 (“One sees judges 
dismissing cases in favor of a range of mechanisms that they find as suitable as—or more 
suitable than—the criminal law to achieve the relevant priorities.” (emphasis added)). 
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efforts to step into the breach might well be laudable from that 
perspective.143 But that does not make it any less a step into an 
executive law enforcement role, albeit one authorized and 
encouraged by state law.144 The final Part of this Article evaluates 
whether that step may be justifiable. 
III. THE STATE JUDGE AS LEGISLATOR 
This last descriptive Part highlights two of the quasi-legislative 
functions of state court judges. By calling them quasi-legislative, I 
mean to draw attention to the fact that, when carrying out these 
roles, judges are making law and setting policy. Of course, judges 
also “make law” in the context of common law decisionmaking, but 
common law judging is nonetheless rooted in the resolution of 
adversarial disputes.145 This Part is about arenas in which state 
court judges set policy outside of resolving any adversarial dispute. 
That is, the judges choose to articulate new law in these contexts in 
the same way that legislators do so: because an event in the world 
triggers some obligation to act (like the depletion of a budget at the 
end of a budgeting cycle), or simply because they believe it to be 
wise policy.146 
First, this Part discusses the roles that state court judges play in 
apportioning legislative districts in response to the decennial 
census. Second, it explores the roles that state court judges play in 
creating specialized criminal courts because they think such courts 
are a good idea. 
 
 143. See id. at 341–44, 348–49. 
 144. Indeed, some judges see themselves as courageously “tak[ing] charge of the 
prosecution.” People v. More, 12 P. 631, 632 (Cal. 1887); see Roberts, supra note 129, at 348–49 
(collecting cases). 
 145. The same can be said to describe, depending on one’s jurisprudential priors, 
judicial activity in constitutional cases. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) (contrasting textualism and originalism with 
a “common law approach to constitutional interpretation”). 
 146. One more widely appreciated example of a way in which state court judges “act[] 
not in their familiar capacity as adjudicators deciding cases” but instead in a “quasi-
legislative role” is the drafting and promulgation of rules of civil and criminal procedure. 
Crespo, supra note 27, at 1380 (rules of criminal procedure); see Clopton, supra note 27 (rules 
of civil procedure). But as noted above, see explanation and sources cited at supra note 27, 
this is a role served by federal court judges as well, at least in some fashion. And a robust 
normative debate surrounds that practice. See sources cited at supra note 26 for additional 
support. What has been lacking, however, is a more systematic evaluation of the array of 
similar functions explored in this Article. 
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In roughly half the states, judges play important roles in 
redistricting—both with respect to congressional districts and state 
legislative districts—that operate wholly outside the context of 
dispute resolution. To be sure, individuals or groups file lawsuits 
from time to time to challenge a given map, and judges will 
necessarily resolve that dispute by issuing a judgment holding that 
a particular map does or does not run afoul of constitutional or 
statutory provisions.147 But that is decidedly not the full extent of 
the state judge’s role in redistricting. Rather, many states ask their 
judges to draw the district lines themselves. And others might 
begin moving in that direction if concerns about partisan 
gerrymandering sufficiently move the public to reallocate the 
districting power away from the legislatures that traditionally and 
typically take the laboring oar.148 
Meanwhile, not only is redistricting an activity wholly removed 
from dispute resolution, but it is an activity that is qualitatively 
legislative. First, the activity entails the making of law: district 
maps are statutes,149 and they reflect policy choices about the 
structure of political representation.150 Second, the Elections Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution suggests as much by providing that “[t]he 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof.”151 Third, the Supreme Court has likewise characterized 
redistricting as a “legislative function.”152 And when the Supreme 
Court recently held that citizens can draw district lines by 
referendum consistent with the terms of the Elections Clause, it 
 
 147. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018). 
 148. Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that partisan 
gerrymandering claims are not justiciable under the U.S. Constitution). 
 149. See, e.g., S.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016), 
https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E1/Bills/Senate/PDF/S2v4.pdf. 
 150. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966) (observing that redistricting 
“involves choices about the nature of representation”). 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 152. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Cmm’n., 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 
(2015) (“[O]ur precedent teaches that redistricting is a legislative function . . . .”); see also id. 
at 2687 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing that redistricting is a legislative function). 
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explained that this was so because the citizens were thereby 
engaged in a lawmaking function.153 
And yet, state court judges perform, or at least participate in, 
that function.154 In a number of states, members of the state’s 
highest court—often but not only the Chief Justice—are part of the 
process by which a map is created in the first instance. In Alaska 
and Vermont, for example, state legislative districts are drawn by 
an independent commission with at least one member chosen by 
the state’s Chief Justice.155 In Illinois, Hawaii, Montana, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington, those districts are likewise drawn 
by independent commissions, and while their members are not 
regularly chosen by the state courts, the courts serve a tiebreaking 
function: An even number of commissioners are chosen by other 
(ostensibly partisan) officials, and if those commissioners cannot 
agree on a tiebreaking (ostensibly nonpartisan) last member, the 
state high court chooses that last member.156 But California, Maine, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Washington all go even a step further: 
state court judges themselves serve as backup mapmakers. That is, 
if the legislature or independent commission cannot agree on  
a map, the map is either drawn by a group of officials which 
includes a judge or by a panel of judges entirely on their own.157 
This means a court will create the district map even in the absence of 
a party seeking a judgment. And like the legislature itself, it can do so 
without many constraints beyond those required to respect 
constitutional rights.158 
 
 153. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion) (“[R]edistricting ‘involves lawmaking in its essential 
features and most important aspect.’” (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)); id. 
at 2676 (referring to “lawmaking by initiative to direct a State’s method of apportioning 
congressional districts”). 
 154. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“[S]tate courts have a significant role 
in redistricting.”). 
 155. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI § 8(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1904(a) (2019).  
In addition, Colorado’s Constitution provides that every map created by the state’s 
independent redistricting commission is automatically submitted to the state’s Supreme 
Court for review. COLO. CONST. art. V § 48(2). 
 156. See ILL. CONST. art. IV § 3(b); HAW. CONST. art. IV § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V § 14(2); 
N.J. CONST. art. II §§ 2(1)(c), (3)(2); PA. CONST. art. II § 17(b); WASH. CONST. art. II § 43(2). 
 157. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI § 2(j); ME. CONST. art. IV pt. 1 § 3, pt. 2 § 2; MISS. CONST. 
art. XIII § 254; N.J. CONST. art. II § 2(3); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.100. 
 158. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (discussing equal 
protection limitations on districting). 
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But even if one considers circumstances in which a party has 
invoked the jurisdiction of the court in the dispute-resolution 
context, some states instruct their courts to do more than issue a 
judgment and leave its resolution to legislative actors. In six states, 
the courts are required to create remedial redistricting maps on 
their own upon finding that a map created by legislative actors is 
unlawful. In Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and Michigan, the 
state high court either is permitted (in Arkansas and Michigan) or 
required (in Florida, Iowa, and Louisiana) to create its own map in 
that circumstance.159 In North Carolina, the same is true, although 
that role is served by a special three-judge appellate court.160 
B. Establishing Specialized Criminal Courts 
While the redistricting function is arguably cabined, it is not the 
only quasi-legislative function that state court judges serve. 
Increasingly, and without the imprimatur or even guidance of state 
law, state court judges have taken upon themselves the initiative to 
establish specialized courts for particular offenses or particular 
classes of defendants. 
As many actors in the criminal justice system reexamine some 
of the assumptions or theories of punishment at its core—whether 
due to concerns about overcrowded jails, the incidence of 
recidivism, racial and other biases, and much more—one 
frequently suggested reform is the creation of specialized courts.161 
One form of specialized court is the “problem-solving court”: a 
diversion of defendants away from the ordinary criminal courts 
and into a venue geared towards treatment, monitoring, 
community service, and prevention rather than incarceration.162 
These have appeared in a host of contexts: drug courts, domestic 
violence courts, gun courts, truancy courts, homelessness courts, 
and others.163 The through-line in these problem-solving courts is 
 
 159. See ARK. CONST. art. VIII § 5; FLA. CONST. art. III § 16(c)–(f); IOWA CONST. art. III 
§ 36; LA. CONST. art. III § 6(B); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 3.72, 4.262(3) (2020). 
 160. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-267.1; 120-2.4(a) (2016). 
 161. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 13, at 1482; James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal 
Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2003). 
 162. Collins, supra note 13, at 1483. 
 163. Id.; see Problem Solving Courts: Addressing a Spectrum of Issues, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG 
CT. PROFS., https://www.ncsc.org/topics/alternative-dockets/problem-solving-courts/ 
home [https://perma.cc/RL2B-3A88]. 
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that they take a more active role in the rehabilitation of offenders 
by bringing together judges, court staff, and subject-area 
professionals to develop treatment plans, offer education  
(about, say, gun safety), point the way towards supportive social 
services, address underlying issues in the lives of those who come 
before the court, and preserve peace and safety (as in the domestic 
violence context, for example).164 So, to take the example of drug 
courts, the idea is that treating a defendant’s drug addiction is more 
likely than traditional incarceration to reduce his propensity for 
recidivism and to therefore “solve” the defendant’s (and, in turn, 
society’s) “problem.”165 
A second and more recent trend in the world of specialized 
courts is the creation of what Erin Collins has called “status 
courts”—courts specialized, not along the lines of a particular class 
of offense, but a particular class of offender.166 The most common 
thus far are veterans courts and girls courts, both based on the idea 
that the relevant populations are “‘niche’ groups with ‘unique’ 
needs the system does not, but should, address.”167 In fact, many of 
these status courts are presided over by judges who are members 
of the same status group and, the story goes, are therefore better 
able to relate to and serve as mentors for the offenders who appear 
in their specialized courts.168 Notably, and in contrast to the 
problem-solving courts discussed above, advocates for status 
courts typically do not ground their advocacy only on the claim that 
such courts lead to better outcomes. Rather, they contend that 
 
 164. See Problem Solving Courts, supra note 163; Collaborative Courts, SUPERIOR CT. OF 
CAL., COUNTY OF ORANGE, https://www.occourts.org/directory/collaborative-courts/ 
[https://perma.cc/ATF2-HLDU]. 
 165. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1488–89. 
 166. See generally Collins, supra note 13 (studying status courts). 
 167. Id. at 1483–84; see also Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive 
Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 363 (2009); Hawaii Girls Court, 
HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, https://www.girlscourthawaii.org/. 
 168. Collins, supra note 13, at 1484, 1498, 1522. As Judge Patrick Dugan, a veteran and 
judge on the Philadelphia Municipal Veterans Court, put it, he can relate to the defendants 
who appear before him because he has “been there, done that, walked in their boots.”  
Ines Novacic, For Veterans in Legal Trouble, Special Courts Can Help, CBS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014, 
2:32 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-veterans-legal-trouble-special-courts-can-
help [https://perma.cc/PPY7-KCV5]. 
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creating such courts is “morally the right thing to do” for the sake 
of the offender.169  
This Article does not intend to explore whether or not 
establishing these specialized courts is normatively desirable,170 but 
rather focuses on who makes the decision to establish them. The 
foregoing discussion—like so much of the academic and popular 
literature on specialized courts—was framed in the passive voice 
because there is in fact little in the way of a sustained or empirical 
account of the process by which these courts come into being  
or, critically, of who initiates that process. What evidence does 
exist, however, points towards judges themselves as the creators  
and decisionmakers.171 
That judges are generally the driving force here is reflected 
throughout the stories that are held up as emblematic of the best or 
most inspirational of the system. The first drug court in the United 
States was created in Dade County, Florida in 1989 “by 
administrative order of the chief judge of Florida’s 11th Judicial 
Circuit.”172 The availability of funding incentives followed the 
judge’s lead, with the 1994 federal Crime Act authorizing the U.S. 
Department of Justice to make grants to fund such courts 
throughout the country.173 And state government efforts to 
 
 169. Ari Melber, For Vets, Rehab Rather than Prison, MSNBC (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:57 PM), 
https://www.msnbc.com/the-cycle/vets-rehab-rather-prison-msna257666 [https://perma 
.cc/U3NB-EC9Z] (quoting then-Attorney General Eric Holder); see Collins, supra note 13,  
at 1509–10. 
 170. Collins, for her part, makes compelling arguments that the verdict is decidedly 
mixed. Collins, supra note 13, at 1500–27. 
 171. See Sohil Shah, Authorization Required: Veterans Treatment Courts, the Need for 
Democratic Legitimacy, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 67, 
91–96 (2014) (noting that, in many states, “judges create these courts without legislative 
authorization” and therefore “have almost unlimited power to establish” them and “to 
determine their structures, rules, and procedures”); Leib, supra note 27, at 723 (discussing a 
local judge who was so interested in setting up a drug court despite the objections of his local 
legislature that, “[a]lthough he was unable to convince his locality to pay its drug council to 
sit with his criminal docket, he was active in getting a nearby locality’s council to come help 
his court”). More recently, some states have taken the step of authorizing judges to create 
these courts and have prescribed “basic requirements and policies,” but even in those states, 
it is often (though not always) the judges themselves who are empowered to make the 
creation decisions. Shah, supra, at 69–70, 84–91. 
 172. Drug Court’s Holistic Approach, MIAMI DADE COUNTY 
https://www.miamidrugcourt.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44
&Itemid=54 (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
 173. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 L. & POL’Y 
125, 127 (2001). 
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centralize and organize these ad hoc judge-driven creation 
decisions followed the money (and, of course, the arguable success 
of the drug courts themselves).174 Similarly, the first veterans court 
in the United States was opened in 2008 by Robert Russell, a judge 
on the City Court in Buffalo, New York.175 Judge Russell took that 
step based on his belief that it was warranted. And while he drew 
on guidelines that the U.S. Department of Justice had already 
prepared for earlier generations of drug courts, that choice was 
seemingly his to make, as were the “slight modifications” he 
made.176 The same was true when Judge Jo Ann Ferdinand chose to 
create New York City’s first veterans court after a particularly 
moving interaction with a Vietnam veteran defendant in her 
courtroom.177 Once again, federal attention and encouragement 
followed the ad hoc efforts of these individual judges.178 And the 
first girls court in the country was opened in 2004 in Oahu, Hawaii 
by the judges on the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit in that 
state.179 Those judges appear to have crafted the program and 
procedures from scratch themselves.180 
This is not to say that all are sanguine about the role judges play 
here.181 A number of commentators and judges wish that 
circumstances were different and that state legislatures and 
executive branch officials would play a larger role in managing and 
 
 174. Id. at 126–27. 
 175. Collins, supra note 13, at 1492; Russell, supra note 167, at 357 n.†. City courts are 
part of the New York State court system. See Courts Outside New York City, NYCOURTS.GOV 
(Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/cts-outside-nyc-CITY.shtml. 
 176. Russell, supra note 167, at 364–65. 
 177. Kristen Meriwether, Veterans Treatment Courts Offer Hope, but Only in Three 
Boroughs, GOTHAM GAZETTE, https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.%20php%20 
government/5279-veterans-treatment-courts-offer-hope-but-only-in-three-boroughs 
[https://perma.cc/DV8Q4M6F] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
 178. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STRENGTHENING OUR MILITARY FAMILIES: 
MEETING AMERICA’S COMMITMENT 12 (2011), http://www.defense.gov/home/features/201 
1/0111_initiative/strengthening-our-military_january_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/79K2-
U8JL] (announcing a commitment to provide federal support for further development of the 
“Veterans Treatment Court concept”). 
 179. HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, supra note 167. 
 180. Id. 
 181. But see Janet DiFiore, The Excellence Initiative and the Rule of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1053, 1061 (2018) (lauding new opioid courts in New York as examples of “how state court 
systems are laboratories of reform, with judges and court staff increasingly taking on 
leadership roles” that “gain [them] credibility with the public and [with] partner branches of 
government” and that “advance the rule of law”). 
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reforming these aspects of the criminal justice system. But they feel 
that “the courts have no choice but to step into the void.”182 Then-
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Judith Kaye, 
sounded a similar note in a 2000 roundtable conversation with 
other judges and scholars, arguing that “[t]he political branches are 
choosing to put more and more cases into the courts” and that 
judges are “simply trying to do the best job that [they] can” to 
“improve the system.”183 
Some judges have expressed even greater consternation about 
taking on the mantle of court-creation.184 Truman Morrison, a judge 
on the District of Columbia Superior Court,185 has called it “terribly 
odd that America is looking to the judicial branch to solve these 
problems,” and he places the blame with the “abject failure of the 
other branches of government.”186 Taking it a step further, Judge 
Morrison has noted that he is “concerned about the power that 
judges have” to create new courts and that he does not think that 
judges should be free “to leave their traditional role and be 
informed only by their own personal definition of what justice 
is.”187 “When you try and channel the energies of social change into 
the judicial branch,” he cautioned, “it’s not a good fit.”188  
Judge Cindy Lederman of the Florida courts’ Judicial Division has 
likewise observed that “the public is now coming to the courts and 
asking for solutions to problems like crime, domestic violence,  
and substance abuse,” and has cautioned that, if judges “accept  
this challenge, we’re no longer the referee or the spectator.  
 
 182. Nolan, supra note 161, at 1541–42. 
 183. Greg Berman, “What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?” Problem Solving in the State 
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 85 (2000). 
 184. Some commentators share this concern. See Shah, supra note 171, at 82 (arguing 
that “[c]onstitutional issues arise when judges act in roles traditionally associated with the 
executive or legislature” and observing that “problem-solving court judges have exceeded 
their delegated authority in the past”). 
 185. The District of Columbia Superior Court is the general jurisdiction state-equivalent 
trial court in the District. See Superior Court, D.C. CTS., https://www.dccourts.gov/superior-
court (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
 186. Berman, supra note 183, at 80; see id. at 83 (quoting Professor Ellen Schall as saying 
that “the system from which the problem-solving courts have emerged was a failure on  
any count”). 
 187. Id. at 81. 
 188. Id. at 82. 
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We’re a participant in the process [which is] quite a leap.  
It’s not traditional.”189 
Whether one approves or disapproves of the move, then, the 
fact remains that the establishment of new courts to solve problems 
that some perceive in the criminal justice system—as apt and 
urgent as those perceptions might be—is not the ordinary job of a 
judge. Indeed, it is the ordinary job of a legislature. The next and 
final Part of this Article evaluates the propriety of state court judges 
serving such a function.  
IV. ASSESSING AND REFORMING THE ROLES OF THE STATE JUDICIARY 
Given the breadth of the roles played by state court judges, and 
also given the weight of those functions and the interests at stake 
for the citizens who encounter state court judges in these capacities, 
it is crucial not only to recognize these roles but to evaluate how 
they ought to be conceived and treated.190 The mere fact that they 
depart from the classic conception of the judge is, of course, not 
itself a cause for concern.191 But on their merits, these roles might 
raise significant concerns. This Part examines the interests 
implicated in each of the roles discussed in this Article, evaluates 
the degree to which the status quo respects those interests, and 
explores whether and how those interests might be better served. 
While there might be many different ways in which a process can 
be said to respect or not respect the interests at stake, I follow a well-
worn path in administrative law and institutional design 
scholarship and focus here on the desirability and presence of 
decisionmaker accountability, decisionmaker expertise, and 
decisionmaker discretion—that is, how much we might want that 
feature to exist with respect to each function, and how much it does 
exist in the existing allocation of that function.192 Accountability 
 
 189. Id. at 80. 
 190. As noted at the outset, this Article does not claim to capture the full universe of 
these roles. The examples described, however, shed light on how large that universe is and 
motivate the normative analysis in this Part. 
 191. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1307 (1999) (arguing that “[p]articular institutions serve complex functions in each 
constitutional system” and that each should be assessed on its own terms). 
 192. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255, 2331–38 
(2001); see also Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 481–82, 
488–91, 496–501 (2014); Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the 
Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1770–76 (2012); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial 
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speaks to whether the decisionmaker is or should be electorally or 
politically responsive when making a particular decision; expertise 
to whether the decisionmaker might require specific knowledge in 
order to be good at making the decision; and discretion to the 
amount of freedom to maneuver we might want the decisionmaker 
to have to make individualized determinations and judgment calls. 
This Part takes the three rough categories set out above in order 
of increasing concern—starting with the executive law enforcement 
role and moving first to the quasi-legislative and then to the quasi-
administrative roles. This last category raises the most significant 
problems, at least as currently structured, and therefore warrants 
the most fulsome discussion about the paths for possible reform. 
A. State Judges as Enforcers 
The law enforcement role played by state court judges explored 
in this Article is the judge’s power to terminate a prosecution sua 
sponte by ordering its dismissal because the judge thinks the 
prosecution unwise or unjust.193 To an observer schooled in the 
more rigid separation of powers doctrine applicable at the federal 
level under the U.S. Constitution, this allocation might seem odd, 
at a minimum, and perhaps even inappropriate. But the relative 
pliability of the separation of powers in the states allows for more 
experimentation with alternative arrangements194—and, in turn, 
demands a normative rather than doctrinal evaluation of  
that arrangement. 
Here, the threatened interests are primarily those of the 
prosecution (and, in turn, the public on whose behalf she 
purportedly acts).195 Because we are considering here not the judge 
who rules on a defense motion to dismiss a prosecution but rather 
the judge who makes that decision on her own motion, the party 
whose authority is most potentially inappropriately displaced by 
the judge’s decision is the prosecutor who is deprived of the 
 
Deference, and Administrative Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 
2059 (2011); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–91 (2003). 
 193. See supra Part II. 
 194. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 195. For a more nuanced understanding of where the interests of the public truly fall 
in criminal prosecutions, see Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019). 
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opportunity to prosecute the case. Put another way, the judge’s 
choice not to dismiss a prosecution leaves both prosecution and 
defense in exactly the same position they were in before the judge 
made her choice not to act: the prosecution can continue with its 
case, the defense can move for dismissal, both parties can engage 
in plea bargaining, and so on. But the judge’s choice to dismiss a 
prosecution benefits the defendant and displaces the prosecutor. It 
is in this specific sense that I speak of the prosecution’s interests in 
advancing a case being those primarily at stake in this context. 
With that in mind, we can proceed to evaluate whether the 
prosecution’s interests are adequately protected. There are a few 
ways in which they might not be. The first has to do with the 
allocation of discretion. Here, an entity entirely outside of the 
prosecutor’s chain of authority—wholly unaccountable to the 
District Attorney or the state’s Attorney General—has the power to 
reverse a decision made by and otherwise entrusted to the 
prosecutor. Of course, judges routinely reverse decisions made by 
executive officials, but when they do so, it is because the adversarial 
process has revealed the executive’s decision to have been 
unlawful.196 It is another thing entirely for the judge to substitute 
her choice of wise executive action for the executive’s discretionary 
choice—to replace the prosecutor’s discretion with her own. And, 
as discussed above, that is precisely what at least some judges seem 
to think they are doing when they exert this particular sort of 
enforcement authority.197 If the prosecutor’s interests are 
legitimately worth protecting—and more on that below—it would 
be fair to worry that the judge’s discretionary authority is 
problematic because it threatens those interests. 
Second, insofar as one thinks that prosecutorial discretion is 
generally a wise allocation of power which reflects a prosecutor’s 
superior expertise with respect to the full range of crimes being 
committed in a jurisdiction and the charging choices made across 
the board, it might be worrisome for a judge—who most likely sees 
only a slice of the cases the prosecutor charges and who necessarily 
sees none of the cases the prosecutor does not charge—to be able to 
 
 196. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (providing that federal judges shall “hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” of law that are, among other things, 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 197. See supra notes 142 & 144 and accompanying text. 
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displace the prosecutor’s more expert decision with her own less 
expert one. 
Third, the prosecution might reasonably worry that the general 
public, to which prosecutors are ultimately accountable (by 
election, by perceived mission, or both), would place the blame on 
the prosecutor for “dropping” otherwise publicly desired charges 
when it was in fact the judge who did so through a comparatively 
more obscure provision of state law. This potential scrambling of 
responsibility in the eyes of the public is a perennial concern 
whenever one entity has the power to displace the decision of 
another entity; the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth 
Amendment, for example, is premised in part on the concern that a 
local official will be blamed by her constituents for what was in 
reality a decision forced on her by federal law.198 As the Supreme 
Court has put it, “Accountability is thus diminished when, due to 
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in 
accordance with the views of the local electorate . . . .”199 By the 
same token, one might argue that prosecutorial accountability is 
diminished when, due to a judge’s exercise of this enforcement 
power, the prosecutor cannot prosecute in accordance with the 
views of the local electorate. 
On the other hand, it is not the case that prosecutors are entirely 
without recourse. On the public accountability front, for example, 
elected district attorneys or attorneys general who worry about 
being unfairly punished by voters have strong incentives to defend 
their records and to deploy campaign resources to shift the blame 
back to the meddlesome judge. The dissenters in one of the 
Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering cases made the same point, 
and further argued that the idea that voters will be confused about 
whom to blame “reflects a gross lack of confidence in the electorate 
that is at war with the basic assumptions underlying any 
democratic government.”200 
But there nonetheless remain legitimate objections rooted in 
expertise and discretion: the idea that prosecutors are better 
 
 198. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (noting, in the context of a 
federal law requiring state and local law enforcement to conduct background checks on 
handgun purchasers, that “it will likely be the [local official], not some federal official, who 
will be blamed for any error . . . that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected”). 
 199. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). 
 200. Printz, 521 U.S. at 957 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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situated than judges to make inherently discretionary charging 
decisions. For that reason, and in light of the fact that the judge is 
already taking on a function not ordinarily associated with dispute 
resolution, it seems appropriate to ensure that the judge exercises 
this function with care and in limited circumstances. As discussed 
in Part II, New York takes important steps in the right direction by 
bounding the judge’s power and requiring her to consider ten 
specific factors before concluding that a dismissal is warranted.201 
The other states that do not impose such limits might do well to 
consider them. The fact that many of those states require the judge 
to articulate on the record her reasons for ordering the dismissal is 
an important feature, given that it is widely understood that 
reason-giving requirements tend of their own accord to improve 
the quality of discretionary decisionmaking.202 But explicitly 
indicating what those reasons ought to be would represent an 
improvement.203 Finally, it could be worth considering whether to 
explicitly afford prosecutors an avenue to appeal a judge’s 
dismissal decision if the prosecution feels strongly that it was an 
error or a poor discretionary judgment. 
Of course, one might also feel that prosecutors already have too 
much power in the criminal justice system (or further still, that they 
exercise that power poorly). If you feel that way, then your heart 
probably does not go out to the prosecutor who has her judgment 
displaced by the judge and your hackles are likely not raised by the 
accountability, expertise, and discretion-based analysis offered 
above. That is not unreasonable; among the problems raised by the 
many-hatted state court judge, this is hardly the gravest. But even 
so, the reforms just outlined could result in a more coherent system 
that better reflects the interests of all of the participants. 
 
 201. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 202. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 
103 GEO. L.J. 259, 303 (2015); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-
Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1233 (2014); Frederick Schauer, Giving 
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657–58 (1995); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American 
Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1813 (2012);  
Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1280–82 (2009). 
 203. Indeed, one might say that New York’s approach not only mitigates the problem 
but neutralizes it by placing the judge in a somewhat more classically “judicial” role. That is, 
it asks the judge to apply legislatively mandated criteria to evaluate executive action in a 
way that is closer to typical administrative law practice. 
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B. State Judges as Legislators 
This Article described two of the unique quasi-legislative roles 
that state judges serve: redistricting and establishing specialized 
criminal courts. As a categorical matter, these operate at the level 
of broad policymaking rather than individualized determinations. 
So, the discretion question is not implicated here in the same way 
that it is in the other two contexts. But the freedom to act based 
largely on the decisionmaker’s sense of good policy only raises the 
stakes of the accountability and expertise questions. And on that 
score, the judges’ role in establishing specialized criminal courts 
raises more serious concerns than their role in redistricting. 
1. Redistricting 
When it comes to redistricting—where judges participate in the 
process in a number of ways including serving as tiebreaking or 
backup mapmakers204—the interests at stake are both dramatic and 
of a few different types. First, there is the interest of the voters to 
“band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who 
espouse their political views.”205 The drawing of district lines can 
either facilitate that interest by preserving coherent communities of 
interest or interfere with that interest by splitting such 
communities.206 Whether one understands this interest as finding 
voice in the First Amendment,207 in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments,208 or elsewhere, the important point for present 
purposes is that the power to draw district lines implicates interests 
of constitutional moment for voters. Second, there is the related 
interest of each voter in being treated equally vis-à-vis other voters 
 
 204. See supra Section III.A. 
 205. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Cal. 
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. 
Ct. 2484, 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (referring to “the most fundamental of [citizens’] 
constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with 
others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives”). 
 206. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993) (“Dividing [a] minority group 
among various districts so that it is a majority in none may prevent the group from electing 
its candidate of choice.”). 
 207. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 208. See, e.g., Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 152–53 (applying the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
which was enacted “to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee”); Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that political gerrymandering 
claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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by the line-drawer.209 Third, both of these personal interests are 
matched by broader societal interests in a functioning democracy 
in which all of the voters have faith in the system.210 And in turn, 
because the drawing of district lines determines the people to 
whom a particular elected official is responsible, the power to draw 
those lines carries with it the power to shape or distort channels of 
accountability, or even to direct that accountability away from the 
electorate and to the line-drawer himself instead.211 A distorted 
electorate is, as the Supreme Court has put it, “altogether 
antithetical to our system of representative democracy,”212 so it 
ought to be beyond much dispute that the redistricting power 
implicates voters’ fundamental interests in a functional democratic 
form of government. 
We must turn, then, to consider whether these interests are 
well-protected when state court judges are charged with drawing 
these district lines—either in absolute terms or relative to when 
legislatures do it. As discussed above, this function has long been 
understood as a “legislative function,”213 with the implicit ideal 
being that the line-drawers themselves would be electorally 
accountable. This, after all, is the argument that is often made by 
opponents of independent redistricting commissions: we ought not 
want an “unelected, unaccountable institution” to “permanently 
and totally displace[]” the legislature—and through them, the 
 
 209. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (“Classifications of citizens solely on the 
basis of race ‘are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
upon the doctrine of equality.’” (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 
(1943))); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the 
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.”). 
 210. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2511–12 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing districting’s impact on democracy). 
 211. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he partisan gerrymanders here debased and 
dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down the core American idea that all 
governmental power derives from the people. These gerrymanders enabled politicians to 
entrench themselves in office as against voters’ preferences.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 
267, 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 212. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648; see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). Even as a majority of the Court recently found partisan gerrymandering claims 
to be nonjusticiable, it conceded that “[e]xcessive partisanship in districting leads to results 
that reasonably seem unjust” and that “such gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with 
democratic principles.’” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)). 
 213. See supra note 183 and accompanying text; Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2668. 
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voters—from the redistricting process.214 Precisely because so much 
is at stake, there could be real danger in allowing an unaccountable 
entity to exercise that much power. On this theory, the fact that state 
court judges might be thought to be less electorally accountable 
than the legislators themselves makes it problematic to shift this 
role to those judges. 
The problem with this theory is that, as just discussed, 
experience has revealed that the supposedly accountable 
legislature can use its power to draw district lines in ways that 
minimize that very accountability. It therefore becomes difficult to 
argue that the legislature is the best home for this task when the 
legislators instead use their power to insulate themselves from the 
voters. Of course, one could still believe that legislators are the 
wrong people to trust to draw their own district lines and also 
believe that the officials doing so ought to be electorally 
accountable. But it must be emphasized that many state court 
judges are in fact elected.215 In contrast to appointed federal judges, 
then, state court judges straddle the line between accountable and 
unaccountable. Sometimes this fact raises serious concerns about 
the judge’s discretion when it comes to dispute resolution or some 
of the quasi-administrative functions further evaluated below,216 
but in this particular arena, this accountability helps justify the 
judge’s quasi-legislative role and helps temper concerns about 
what otherwise might look like too much power vested in too 
secure an official.217 Moreover, recall that, at least for now, in no 
state are the judges alone the first-choice line-drawer. Rather, they 
always serve either in a backup or tiebreaking capacity—to take 
 
 214. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2691 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 215. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An 
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 71 
(2011) (noting that “89% of all state court judges face the voters in some type of election”). 
 216. E.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696–97 (1995) (“[T]o the extent majoritarian pressures influence 
judicial decisions because of judges’ electoral calculations, elective judiciaries seem, at least 
at first glance, irreconcilable with one of the fundamental principles underlying 
constitutionalism.”); infra notes 243, 287 and accompanying text. See generally JED 
HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
AMERICA (2012). 
 217. By the same token, this particular feature of state court judging might help justify 
the fact that those judges are so often elected. 
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charge once the legislature has failed to do its job—or in a 
commission capacity along with other accountable officials.218 
Finally, the concern that judges might lack subject-matter 
expertise (say, on population statistics and mapmaking) is not as 
important here as it is in other contexts discussed in this Article 
because, while redistricting can be technical, the judges—just like 
the legislatures—can and do employ the services of technical 
experts.219 Armed with that assistance, the judges are likely just as 
capable as any decisionmaker of making smart choices. Indeed, 
they might be more expert than legislators when it comes to the 
limits on redistricting discretion imposed by constitutional and 
statutory law. 
In sum, notwithstanding the fact that the role calls upon them 
to do something beyond traditional dispute resolution, state court 
judges are fairly well-situated to participate in the redistricting 
process in the ways in which they currently do. By virtue of their 
blend of electoral accountability and separation from the 
legislature, judges can manage and adequately serve the important 
individual and systemic interests at stake. And given the 
rampant—and now unchecked by federal courts220—practice of 
partisan gerrymandering by state legislatures, more citizens in 
more states might well conclude that state court judges ought to 
play this role. 
2. Establishing specialized criminal courts 
Once we turn to the judges’ establishment of specialized courts, 
however, the practice is harder to defend. There are a number of 
decisions that these judges are making—whether to have 
specialized courts, which ones to establish, what procedures to 
adopt, and what remedial schemes to offer all come to mind—and, 
in all of them, the interests at stake are not only important, but 
numerous and pointing in (at least potentially) different directions. 
There are, of course, the interests of the accused individuals. 
 
 218. See supra Section III.A. 
 219. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083, 1085–86 (Pa. 2018) 
(noting appointment of Professor Nathaniel Persily “as advisor to assist the Court in 
adopting, if necessary, a remedial congressional redistricting plan”). 
 220. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (holding that 
“partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal 
courts”). 
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Remember that the most notable of these courts have thus far been 
created for veterans, girls, and individuals struggling with drug 
addiction, so the accused individuals’ interests would center on 
seeing structures that offer a fair hearing that respects their 
arguably unique needs, affords just resolutions, and results in 
appropriate punishment that provides for meaningful 
opportunities for rehabilitation.221 There are also the interests of the 
prosecutors in having a system that facilitates prosecuting and 
sentencing offenders in ways the prosecutors find appropriate. Of 
course, many prosecutors might ultimately agree with a defendant 
about what a proper process and result looks like; my point is 
simply that they have their own conception and their own stake in 
seeing it come to fruition. There are also the interests of victims—
where the offenses in question are not victimless—in having their 
needs met and in seeing their vision of justice implemented. And 
there are the concentric circles of impact which ripple out from any 
given prosecution: the families of the defendants, the immediate 
community, and the broader public. All of them have a stake in 
how the criminal justice system is operated and in the outcomes  
it produces. 
With all of that on the table, the question is whether these 
diverse and weighty interests are appropriately served when state 
court judges decide whether to create new status and specialty 
courts and how to structure them. The strongest argument that they 
are so served is twofold. First, state court judges have expertise in 
the functioning of the criminal justice system. They see it every day 
(or at least the ones engaged in this enterprise do) and are 
positioned to see it from a somewhat neutral position, at least as 
compared to prosecutors and defense attorneys, defendants, and 
victims.222 They also are better acquainted with the system’s 
realities than are legislators, who operate at something of a remove 
and would need to be educated—by the judges themselves, as well 
 
 221. Collins, supra note 13, at 1483–84; see supra Section III.B. 
 222. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in 
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2052 (2016) (“[S]ystemic facts [about the criminal 
legal system] frequently reside within the considerable amounts of information already 
within criminal courts’ custody and control.” (emphasis removed)). Crespo’s focus is on 
constitutional criminal law, see id. at 2050 & n. 1, rather than the sort of legislating about the 
criminal legal system discussed here. But his call for judges to empower themselves by their 
expertise and to regulate that process has resonance with arguments that judges 
appropriately act similarly in this quasi-legislative arena. 
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as by others—in order to approach the level of experience that the 
judges already have. Second, one could argue that it would be good 
for experts to construct the “best” criminal justice system and that, 
in order to do so, those experts would need to feel safe to buck 
public opinion and would therefore need to be insulated from 
electoral recrimination and accountability. The judge is often held 
out as such an actor. 
The first argument from expertise is a plausible one. But the 
second argument about the virtue of judges’ unaccountability fails 
here for a few reasons. First, as discussed above, many state court 
judges are elected and so, even taking the argument at face value, 
these judges would not fit the bill. But more deeply, the various 
interests at stake here point in so many different directions and are 
not capable of resolution by reference to some Platonic ideal of a 
criminal justice system. Far from it, they must be reconciled, traded 
against one another, and hammered into compromise. Expertise 
about the inputs cannot do that; only a mandate to make policy by 
balancing the diverse needs and preferences of the people can. And 
for that reason, establishing and structuring these courts needs to be 
done by a democratically accountable actor with the capacity to 
hear those views, strike those balances, and back them up with the 
institutional credibility that makes even dissatisfied constituents 
accept the bargain.223 
So, why not the elected judges? They have the expertise and the 
formal structural accountability, but what they lack is the capacity 
for public debate, for airing the issues and various perspectives, 
and for offering solutions that are uniform rather than ad hoc. And 
so long as judges are the main movers on this quasi-legislative 
issue, this will not change because judges are just not equipped to 
hold the sort of hearings and debates that legislators do when they 
make policy. They are not well-situated to absorb in a rigorous way 
policy recommendations from individuals and groups arrayed 
across all facets of the issue. They are also often personally invested 
 
 223. Cf. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME 
& JUST. 283, 283, 300 (2003) (“Legal authorities gain when they receive deference and 
cooperation from the public,” and such deference and cooperation are more forthcoming 
when the public has the ability to “state [its] views to an authority and to feel that those 
views are being considered.”). 
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in perpetuating a particular model of a specialized court.224 This is 
particularly problematic given that, as the examples discussed 
above tend to illustrate, far too much turns on a particular judge’s 
personal experience or personal feelings. And finally, any one 
judge’s ability to offer a solution extends only to her own 
courtroom and as far as her power to persuade other judges to do 
similarly.225 By contrast, a state’s legislature is better-situated to 
assimilate all of the perspectives that animate the public’s interests 
and to produce from them uniform, statewide policies. 
Many of the judges who have established these specialized 
courts seem to concede as much and to see themselves as filling a 
second-best role.226 That is, they perceive an urgent need that the 
legislature is not meeting and so have thrust themselves into the 
breach. So this Article does not aim to criticize these judges for what 
they have done, but rather to argue that they are poorly situated to 
do it well and that state legislatures need to take on a greater role.227 
At a minimum, they ought to make express delegations to these 
judges coupled with some degree of overarching policy guidance: 
What are the goals of a specialized criminal justice system? What 
values should judges take into account? Which of the various 
interests at stake are to be centered and which are meant to yield? 
If the legislature were to answer these bigger questions, then judges 
engaged in court-creation could at least shift to implementing 
policy rather than creating it in the first instance, catch as catch can. 
Better still, the legislature could learn from the judges’ expertise—
and learn from the defense bar, the prosecution, victims’ rights 
organizations, psychologists, criminologists, doctors, community 
leaders, and more—and actually make these decisions itself.228 
 
 224. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT 137–39 (2009) (describing judges as “true believers” 
and “proselytizers” for the cause of specialized courts). 
 225. See supra Section III.B. 
 226. See supra notes 182–183, 186 and accompanying text. 
 227. See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 27, at 133 (similarly arguing that the courts’ 
role here “is less a long-term solution than a short-term mitigation, which masks yet does 
not solve” broader societal problems like “an insufficient social safety net in the face of 
growing inequality” that a legislature is better situated to address). 
 228. New York City recently established a pilot program in Brooklyn to create a 
specialized “gun court.” This court is a joint effort of the Mayor, the Commissioner of the 
NYPD, the City’s District Attorneys, the state Attorney General, the state court system’s 
Chief Administrative Judge, the city’s Citizens Crime Commission, and others.  See Mayor de 
Blasio and State Courts Announce “Project Fast Track” to Ensure Shooters Are Quickly Apprehended 
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* * * 
The prior subpart’s evaluation of the state court judge’s law 
enforcement role offered some qualified support for the practice. 
But it argued that the judge’s power to second-guess the 
prosecutor’s discretionary choices ought to be cabined in order to 
better account for the fact that prosecutors are better situated than 
judges to make inherently discretionary charging decisions that call 
upon a wider-angle lens than the judge’s docket might afford her. 
Here, by contrast, the challenge to the judge’s quasi-legislative roles 
comes primarily from the accountability angle because these quasi-
legislative roles implicate a wider array of interests. Indeed, almost 
by definition, making the law involves balancing and assimilating 
a number of competing goals and views. It is therefore important 
that the institutions that set policy be broadly and electorally 
accountable and be positioned to take uniform and consistent 
action. That sounds more like a legislature and less like a judge. 
But state legislatures have their own limitations. This is 
particularly true in the redistricting context. And the fact that state 
court judges are often themselves elected means they may not be as 
inappropriate a substitute as they might otherwise seem. So, where 
the legislature is particularly ill-equipped by virtue of its own 
dynamics to perform a particular legislative task—like 
redistricting—the state court judge can be an eminently justifiable 
understudy. But where the legislature is not necessarily so 
limited—like with respect to setting the structure of the criminal 
courts—the judge’s role is substantially harder to justify.229 
 
and Remain Off the Streets, N.Y.C. (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/044-16/mayor-de-blasio-state-courts-project-fast-track-ensure-shooters-
quickly#/0. While true legislative initiation would be ideal, for the reasons discussed above, 
the fact that this program did not emerge just from the judges themselves and is integrated 
into a broader project with politically accountable actors drawing on wide-ranging 
experience and expertise is a step in the right direction. 
 229. This conclusion calls into some question the legitimacy of what Andrew Crespo 
describes as the often unaccountable role, which he heralds for its potential in the criminal 
law context, that state court judges play or could play in making rules of procedure.  
See Crespo, supra note 26, at 1383–84, 1387 (observing that state courts are “empowered—
quite unlike their federal counterparts—with authority to repeal or override legislatively 
enacted statutes simply by promulgating a countervailing rule of procedure,” and offering 
that this means “[state court judges] are heroes on the horizon” who can use this power to 
“regulate prosecutorial power”). To be sure, Crespo recognizes that judges might exercise 
this power to enable prosecutorial pathologies rather than tame them, see id. at 1388, but that 
question mark is precisely what makes it so dangerous to allocate that legislative role to a 
relatively less accountable institution like the state judiciary. 
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C. State Judges as Administrators 
The last of the hats that state judges wear is their administrative 
one. This Article explored three of the quasi-administrative 
functions over which state judges are assigned authority: name 
change applications, access to abortion, and attorney admission 
and discipline.230 This Section takes these in turn and demonstrates 
that each raises significant concerns, at least as currently structured. 
1. Name change applications 
Take the name change applications first. These implicate 
significant personal interests for the applicants. It might be easy to 
wave these away as flights of fancy for those seeking bizarre 
monikers for shock value, but the reality is often otherwise. These 
applicants are people who are trying to reconcile their identities 
and lived experiences with their legal names.231 For example, until 
recently, those in committed same-sex relationships who lived in 
jurisdictions where the institution of marriage (and the simpler, 
more automatic name change that can ensue) was prohibited to 
them often sought to share a last name that would reflect the reality 
of their commitment.232 Today, even though that particular 
roadblock has been removed,233 trans and non-binary individuals 
continue to seek new names and legal documents that reflect their 
gender identities.234 And stepping outside the LGBT rights context, 
 
 230. See supra Part I. 
 231. See Emens, supra note 40, at 763 (“Names are a highly personal matter, arguably 
constitutive of our selves.”). 
 232. See, e.g., In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (reversing denial of name 
change application made by person seeking to adopt her same-sex partner’s surname); In re 
Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002); In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001); see also Emens, supra note 40, at 790 (making similar observation). 
 233. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 234. See In re Powell, 95 A.D.3d 1631 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (reversing lower court 
rejection of name change application made by transgender person); In re A.M.B., 997 A.2d 
754 (Me. 2010) (vacating and remanding denial of transgender applicant’s petition); In re 
McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1998) (reversing lower court decision denying petition for name 
change); In re Eck, 584 A.2d 859 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (same); In re Ladrach, 513 
N.E.2d 828, 829 (Ohio Prob. 1987) (noting prior granting of transgender applicant’s name 
change petition); see also In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *1 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 
Jan. 6, 2003) (requiring “medical and psychiatric evidence” to “establish whether or not the 
petitioner is a transvestite or a transsexual,” and if not, then “the court will require some 
showing on the part of the [male] petitioner that [the requested name] is regarded as a male 
name in this or some other culture”); J. Dylan Sandifer, A Day in Name-Changing Court, VOX 
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similar identity-setting, identify-reflecting interests exist for 
anyone seeking to legally change their name.235 Without going 
quite so far as to suggest that the First Amendment is directly 
implicated, it is not a stretch to see that one’s ability to change one’s 
legal name finds voice in the same sorts of guarantees of free self-
expression that protect art, literature, protest, and so much more.236 
Of course, everyone is free to “go by” any name they choose in their 
daily lives without even informing the government about it, let 
alone seeking permission.237 But even something as simple as 
boarding a plane or opening a bank account is made simpler when 
one’s legal name matches one’s chosen name, which is no doubt 
why we have an official system in which names can be changed in 
the first place. 
The interests of the applicant are not the only interests at stake, 
however. The broader public has an interest in ensuring that an 
applicant is not changing his name in order to subvert the law—for 
example, by escaping prosecution, evading a sex offender registry, 
or dodging financial obligations. The public might also have an 
interest in preventing the corrosion of national discourse through 
the entry into the mainstream of names which might deeply offend, 
although the degree to which the government can act to serve that 
interest consistent with the First Amendment is questionable, to say 
the least.238 These, however, are more or less the extent of the 
 
(July 25, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/7/16/20694731/how-to-
change-your-name-legal-name. 
 235. See Emens, supra note 40, at 774 (noting that “the act of naming is often an act of 
power” and that “[t]he ability to choose one’s own name is arguably therefore an important 
aspect of self-possession”); Sandifer, supra note 234 (“We all named ourselves, and 
demanded to be recognized.”). 
 236. See Julia Shear Kushner, Note, The Right to Control One’s Name, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
313, 339 (2009) (“[N]ames have been used as a means of expression prior to their regulation 
by the state.”); Laura A. Heymann, A Name I Call Myself: Creativity and Naming, 2 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 585, 594 (2012). 
 237. See supra note 42. 
 238. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), and 
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019), are instructive. The Court concluded in both cases 
that prohibiting the registration of allegedly “disparag[ing]” and “immoral[] or scandalous” 
trademarks violates the First Amendment because “[s]peech may not be banned on the 
ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751; Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at  
2299–300. 
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interests at stake beyond the applicant’s own interests.239 That is, it 
is difficult to come up with any neutral reason beyond avoiding 
enabling fugitives and avoiding substantial offense why anyone 
should care what another adult chooses as his or her legal name.240 
With the significant interests on the side of the applicant’s  
self-expression, and the handful of interests arrayed against the 
applicant, we have to ask whether all of those interests are properly 
served and balanced by state court judges operating in the legal 
regimes currently in place throughout the fifty states. The short 
answer is that some of those regimes hit much closer to the mark 
than others do. But before exploring why, it is important to first 
examine who would be the best sort of decisionmaker along the 
axes of accountability, expertise, and discretion. First, and in 
contrast to the functions already discussed, there is little need for 
electoral accountability here because the public’s interests are so 
much weaker than those of the individual applicants.241 Indeed, 
electoral accountability might in fact be undesirable because it could 
distort the judge’s decisionmaking in pernicious ways.242 For 
example, an electorally accountable decisionmaker might be more 
inclined to rule against name changes that appear to denote a 
change in gender in order to demonstrate his bona fides to an 
electorate that might be hostile to LGBT rights (or, at a minimum, 
to avoid alienating those constituents).243 Once the applicant’s 
 
 239. Perhaps the public might also have an interest in minimizing the administrative 
cost of updating records, but that speaks more to a preference for limiting name change 
rights in general rather than to resolving any particular application. 
 240. See In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (similarly arguing that a 
denial of a name change in the absence of concerns like evasion of prosecution or financial 
obligations “rob[s] the applicant of that which in no way enriches, or protects, the public and 
makes the applicant poor indeed”). 
 241. Of course, if you think that electoral accountability is beneficial in this context, the 
fact that so many state court judges are elected ought to satisfy that demand and make them 
a well-situated decisionmaker. 
 242. See Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH. L. REV. 
1537, 1589–90 (2019) (“The more one believes an agency’s decision needs to be based on 
factors other than public preferences, the less one is appeased by institutional design that 
favors majoritarianism.”). 
 243. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence 
and Retention Elections, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211, 228 (2012) (“In an environment in which 
judges are often obliged to defend their records on salient political issues and make policy 
statements, retention elections (and their competitive complement, nonpartisan elections) 
can create incentives for judges to cater to public opinion . . . .”); Leib, supra note 27, at 720 
(quoting one local judge in New York as saying, “We are all political. It is silly to deny it 
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interests are understood as touching on rights—which we generally 
do not put up for a vote on a case-by-case basis—it should scan as 
problematic to have the entity deciding whether a particular 
person’s right should be respected or not be primarily accountable 
to a broader public.244 An unelected judge would be well-suited 
from this perspective, then, to play this role. Indeed, judges are 
often viewed as the guardians of rights. But as discussed above, 
most state court judges are elected,245 which takes away from  
the claim that they are the best-situated decisionmaker in a context 
that might demand greater insulation from the give and take of 
electoral politics. 
Second, there is little need for expertise here. Neither the 
interests of the applicants nor the interests of the broader public 
implicate anything particularly complicated or technical. On the 
one hand, this is a point in favor of the generalist judge serving as 
the decisionmaker, but on the other hand, it is a point in favor of 
essentially any official serving as the decisionmaker. After all, 
whichever official assigned the task would be capable of learning 
the relevant criteria and of developing experience applying them. 
Third, we come to the need for and desirability of 
individualized discretion. If the interests at stake were generally in 
equipoise, or hard to quantify or balance, then it would be 
important to not only afford the decisionmaker wide discretion but 
to assign the task to a decisionmaker comfortable with making such 
judgment calls—that is, an entity that is otherwise entrusted by 
interested individuals and by the general public with discretion in 
other contexts, and one that has experience balancing 
incommensurable values. A state court judge operating under a 
broad, standardless statute would fit that bill. But the interests at 
stake here are rarely so difficult to balance. In the vast majority of 
cases, the applicant’s interest in self-expression is met on the other 
side by no meaningful public interest. The name being chosen is not 
so offensive or hateful as to be threatening to the public discourse, 
 
about an elective office,” and noting that this “confirms limited prior empirical evidence 
suggesting that lower-level elected judges are responsive to constituents”); cf. Gregory A. 
Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for 
Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004) (finding that elected judges become more punitive 
as the judges approach reelection). 
 244. See Croley, supra note 216, at 727 (“Vindicating individual or minority 
constitutional rights might prove too much for judges for whom reelection is important.”). 
 245. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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nor is the applicant attempting to subvert legal process. In those 
cases, the exercise of discretion on the part of the decisionmaker is 
at best unnecessary—the application should be granted. At worst, 
it risks too many denials of applications based on the 
decisionmaker’s personal sense of impropriety or, as discussed 
above, based on the decisionmaker’s sense of what his electoral 
constituency feels is appropriate. And in the few cases where the 
public’s interest really is triggered, the applicant’s interest is almost 
categorically swamped, and the appropriate course is to deny the 
application. Again, little case-by-case discretion is needed. Of 
course, while determining whether the applicant is attempting to 
subvert the law is more or less a factual inquiry, there might well 
be the need for some degree of discretion when it comes to 
evaluating the hateful or offensive quality of a chosen name. But 
that is just about the size of it, which means that any discretion that 
is afforded to the decisionmaker must be carefully bounded to 
avoid the risk of improper denials. 
Putting these considerations together produces the conclusion 
that, while the state judiciary is not a wholly improper place to put 
the task of resolving name change applications, it is also not the best 
place to put it.246 Instead, this may be an area where an unelected 
bureaucrat could play an important role: Relatively insulated from 
politics and qualified to determine whether an applicant satisfies 
stated criteria without exercising much individualized discretion, a 
true administrator could be the superior decisionmaker for this 
 
 246. An additional risk of making judges the assigned decisionmakers here is that some 
judges may incorrectly perceive based on the very fact of that assignment that they are meant 
to exercise wide discretion. For example, as one New York Civil Court judge put it, he “could 
just as ‘blindly’ sign each and every application to change a name that comes before [him],” 
but the fact that the legislature gave the job to him suggested to him that that is not what he 
was meant to do. In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Jan. 6, 
2003). “If that were the legislative intent, it would be an administrative process” akin to the 
issuance of a birth certificate where no one reviews the propriety of a birth name, rather than 
one assigned to a judge. Id. 
2.POLLACK_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2021  1:44 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:3 (2021) 
776 
 
quasi-administrative task.247 This, after all, is how Hawaii handles 
these applications.248 
But if judges are going to continue to be the decisionmakers, 
then adequate safeguards need to be imposed in order to ensure 
that they do not exercise too much discretion and do not bend too 
far towards electoral accountability or personal caprice at the 
expense of the applicant’s interests.249 Some states do a fairly good 
job at imposing such fetters by statute. For example, Oklahoma, 
discussed above, requires the judge to grant the name change 
application except when the judge finds one of just two facts: that 
the change is “sought for an illegal or fraudulent purpose,” or that 
a “material allegation in the petition is false.”250 Virginia similarly 
provides that the judge “shall” grant the application “unless the 
evidence shows that the change of name is sought for a fraudulent 
 
 247. To be sure, bureaucrats are imperfect. They sometimes use their positions as front-
line faces of authority to citizens to exert influence, provide incorrect information, offer 
unsolicited opinions, and make other “normative interventions” with respect to individual 
applications. Emens, supra note 40, at 824–27 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of 
marital name changes). They also sometimes face resource or staffing constraints, and their 
political independence is not impregnable. See Seifter, supra note 27, at 521–23. In rare 
circumstances, they even sometimes flout constitutional commands outright. See Morgan 
Gstalter, Anti-Gay Marriage County Clerk Kim Davis Loses Reelection in Kentucky, HILL (Nov. 6, 
2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/415366-anti-gay-marriage-country-clerk-
kim-davis-loses-reelection-in-kentucky. But it is not the case that judges never engage in 
similar behavior. See Alabama Chief Justice Tells Probate Judges to Refuse Same-Sex Marriage 
Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/ 
384852553/alabama-chief-justice-tells-probate-judges-to-refuse-same-sex-marriage-licenses; 
infra notes 291–293 and accompanying text (discussing judges and court staff deterring 
minors from availing themselves of their rights in the abortion context). And bureaucrats 
and administrators can still use their subject-matter expertise to serve as “site[s] of legal 
transformation” and as sources “of liberation, rather than unmitigated repression.”  
Marie-Amélie George, Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation of LGBT Rights, 
36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 90 (2017); see id. at 131, 144 (discussing social workers who 
allowed LGBT individuals to adopt and foster children or supported transgender children 
in schools in conflict with outmoded state law). See generally Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant 
Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 (2019) (discussing bureaucratic resistance). Finally, if 
concerns about bureaucratic decisionmaking linger such that this task ought to remain with 
judges, remember that bureaucrats are reviewed by courts. See infra notes 264–271 and 
accompanying text. And if even that is not enough to allay those concerns, that simply makes 
more salient the need to refine the judges’ decisionmaking process as articulated below. 
 248. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 249. Some judges recognize this risk of their own accord. See, e.g., In re Bacharach,  
780 A.2d 579, 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[A] request for a name change should 
not be denied simply because a judge disputes the wisdom of the request or disagrees with 
the reason for the change based on his or her personal views or philosophy.”). 
 250. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1634 (1953); see supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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purpose or would otherwise infringe upon the rights of others.”251 
Others, however, do not. All of the “may-issue” states discussed 
above inherently fail to cabin the judge’s discretion,252 as do  
the “shall-issue” states that vaguely require a finding of 
“reasonable cause” or a “good reason” or the like before the issuing 
obligation is triggered.253 In light of the foregoing analysis, the latter 
jurisdictions should consider reforming their statutes to more 
closely emulate the former. Doing so would better reflect and 
respect the interests at stake and the nature of the decision  
being made.254 
But even the states that limit judges’ discretion in this arena 
could bolster those limitations by expressly providing for appellate 
review that is more active and that better fits the administrative 
quality of the action. Now, judges’ decisions on name change 
applications are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.255 
Where that standard of review applies, “the appellate court will not 
reverse … unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”256 The most 
common examples of the sorts of decisions that are subject to abuse 
of discretion review include sentencing and evidentiary rulings,257 
though those by no means define the universe. This form of review 
is generally justified in a few ways. First, in these contexts, the judge 
“‘has a wide range of choice as to what he decides,’” free from the 
 
 251. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217(C) (2013). 
 252. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 253. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402(c) (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 527.270 (2011) 
(“would be proper”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,271(3) (2008) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 41.290(1) (2013) (“good reason exists”). 
 254. Cf. In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) 
(lamenting the fact that the name change statute “provides no guidance” and suggesting that 
“[p]erhaps the legislature should amend the Civil Rights Law to provide the similar 
guidance in regard to the names of natural persons as it has outlined for corporations”). 
 255. See, e.g., In re Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); In re Parrott,  
392 S.E.2d 48, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); In re Reed, 584 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); In 
re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974). Of course, a court can also conclude that the 
judge has abused his discretion by making a decision contrary to the strict terms of a statute. 
See, e.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 n.3 (2017) (explaining that errors of law 
are necessarily abuses of discretion); In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 847–48 (Ohio 2002) 
(noting abuse-of-discretion standard but reversing denial of name change because applicant 
satisfied defined statutory requirements). 
 256. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar,  
99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879)). 
 257. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (federal sentencing);  
Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 141–42 (evidentiary rulings). 
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sorts of constraints that require a particular outcome upon 
application of a legal rule to a set of facts.258 Second, those contexts 
involve “case-specific” decisions “that turn[] not on ‘a neat set of 
legal rules,’ but instead on the application of broad standards to 
‘multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist 
generalization.’”259 Third, engaging in that sort of application 
entails making individualized judgments—”fact-intensive, close 
calls” with respect to relevance, burden, and the like—in which a 
district court judge is said to have relative “expertise” compared to 
an appellate judge relying on a cold record.260 Fourth, these 
decisions are understood to necessitate “flexibility” for the district 
court judge.261 Finally, the Supreme Court has intimated that this 
form of review is appropriate because some of the decisions to 
which it applies—though I would hasten to add that sentencing is 
not one of them—are of relatively low consequence.262 
None of that is or ought to be true with respect to name change 
applications. There often are—or, as just discussed, should be—
specific criteria governing the judge’s decision and narrowing her 
range of choice. Nothing about the question turns on the sorts of 
close calls about, say, a witness’s demeanor, that have justified 
abuse-of-discretion review in other contexts. Flexibility and 
discretion are thus bugs, not features, in this context. And the 
decision is not one of low consequence. For all of those reasons, 
then, more searching review is called for.263 
Fortunately, we already have a model for what that might look 
like. Appellate courts do not extend such abuse-of-discretion 
deference when the decisionmaker is, rather than a judge, an 
administrative agency or bureaucrat. In the context of 
 
 258. McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1169 (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the 
Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971)). 
 259. Id. at 1167 (citations omitted) (first quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,  
232 (1983); and then quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1988)). 
 260. Id. at 1167–68; see Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560 (holding that abuse of discretion review is 
appropriate where “the district court may have insights not conveyed by the record,” such 
as “whether particular evidence was worthy of being relied upon, or whether critical facts 
could easily have been verified by the Government”). 
 261. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562. 
 262. Id. at 563 (suggesting that abuse-of-discretion review is appropriate with respect 
to awards of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act because the median award 
“has been less than $3,000”). 
 263. Cf. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 27, at 1093 (similarly calling for greater scrutiny of 
local courts’ decisions in dispute-resolution contexts). 
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administrative decisionmakers, appellate courts instead demand a 
showing of “reasoned decisionmaking.”264 At the federal level, 
“virtually every form of agency action” is accompanied by a 
judicial “demand for explicit reason-giving.”265 The same is 
generally true at the state level.266 And while this review remains 
deferential—”[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency”267—it has teeth. The 
administrative decisionmaker is required to offer reasons that 
“have some basis in the record,”268 that are articulated “in sufficient 
detail to permit judicial review,”269 that match those the legislature 
has meant to be considered,270 and that could “lead a reasonable 
person to make” the same judgment.271 
This may not seem like a particularly wide departure from 
abuse-of-discretion review, and it is not. Both are deferential, and 
when compared to truly de novo review, their differences appear 
even less meaningful. But zoom in just a bit on the spectrum and 
important distinctions emerge. Simply put: abuse-of-discretion 
review does not require the decisionmaker to do anything more 
than articulate some defensible basis for his decision. It does not 
necessarily require him to articulate those reasons in a way that can 
be—or actually is—backed up with evidence. Shifting to the form 
of review familiar to administrative law would provide a number 
of benefits.272 First, a reason-giving requirement coupled with 
record review encourages “reflective findings, in furtherance of 
evenhanded application of law, rather than impermissible whim, 
improper influence, or misplaced zeal.”273 Or, as Justice Gorsuch 
 
 264. E.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 375 (1998). 
 265. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,  
962 (2007). 
 266. See, e.g., N.Y. A.P.A. § 307(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 11(8); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 34.05.461(3); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT §§ 313, 318 (2010). 
 267. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402,  
416 (1971). 
 268. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,  
43 (1983). 
 271. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing  
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416). 
 272. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 273. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970);  
see Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect Privacy in 
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recently put it, “The principle that the government must support its 
allegations with substantial evidence, not conclusions and secret 
evidence, guards against arbitrary executive decisionmaking.”274 It 
also guards against the bad side of electoral accountability—that is, 
the concern that the judge will act to satisfy the electorate rather 
than to fairly decide the application on its own terms. Second, it 
prompts decisionmakers to step outside of their own experience 
and to consider and confront their priors because they know that a 
reviewer might not share those priors.275 Third, it reduces the 
negative side effects of (presumed) expertise—the decisionmaker’s 
sense that everyone sees the world as he does and his consequential 
overconfidence in his decisions—and amplifies the positive aspects 
of expertise.276 Finally, all of these benefits together lend legitimacy 
and “increase[] confidence in the fairness” of the decisions  
being made.277 
One objection to this shift towards reason-giving and record 
review is that it could make the decisionmaking process more 
costly and time-consuming on the front end. Particularly at a time 
when many state courts find themselves strapped for cash, it might 
sound perverse to suggest they do more work.278 But it should also 
sound perverse to suggest that important citizen interests be 
 
Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 219–20 (2014) (“Social science demonstrates that 
actors believing they will be held accountable are more likely to work carefully and less likely 
to engage in error, and thus are more likely to make sound decisions and less likely to make 
irrational or ill-informed ones.”). 
 274. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing 
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1313–14 (1975)); see Kerry v. 
Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2144 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that “an opportunity to 
present relevant proofs and arguments [to] a neutral decisionmaker [who will engage in] 
reasoned decisionmaking” “help[s] to guarantee that government will not make a decision 
directly affecting an individual arbitrarily but will do so through the reasoned application of 
a rule of law” (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004)). 
 275. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 588 (2002). 
 276. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 496–99 (2002). 
 277. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1761 (1975). 
 278. See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 27, at 128 (observing that state civil courts 
are “overwhelmed” and handle “98 percent of the tens of millions of civil legal cases filed 
each year”); Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Economic and Social 
Rights, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 259, 268 (Katharine G. Young ed., 
2018) (“Not only did court budgets decline after the 2008 recession, six states closed 
courthouses a day a week; and nine sent judges on unpaid furloughs.”). 
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afforded inadequately careful process in the name of saving money. 
So, if one is truly concerned about the burden on state courts here, 
the responses ought to be either to apply even more pressure on 
state legislatures to fix these budgetary shortfalls, or to reallocate 
this task to another entity with the resources to do it effectively. 
Regardless, though, the more thoughtful first-line decisionmaking 
on offer here need not be significantly more expensive. After all, the 
issue, while weighty for the individual, is not exactly complex. The 
record the judge would be expected to compile should therefore not 
be particularly taxing to assemble. 
In sum, requiring that judges articulate their reasons and root 
those reasons in an evidentiary record when they make name 
change application decisions would ameliorate some of the risks 
associated with entrusting that decision to a state court judge.  
It would also better reflect the quasi-administrative nature of  
the decision. 
2. Minors’ access to abortion 
The analysis is similar with respect to minors’ access to abortion 
without parental involvement. Yet again, the interests of the 
applicant are profound and substantial, and they implicate rights 
of constitutional dimension.279 And yet again, those are not the only 
interests at stake. To be clear, the question in these cases is not, or 
at least is not meant to be, whether the applicant is entitled to an 
abortion or not.280 Rather, the question is whether the applicant is 
entitled to an abortion without parental involvement. And that, 
according to the Supreme Court, turns on whether the minor can 
show “that she is mature enough and well enough informed to 
make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, 
independently of her parents’ wishes,” or that, regardless, “the 
desired abortion would be in her best interests.”281 So while the 
minor has an interest in exercising her right to an abortion and to 
 
 279. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion); 
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976). 
 280. Because the question is not meant to be whether the applicant is entitled to an 
abortion or not, there is no need here to account for other sorts of interests that some might 
argue weigh against a woman’s right to abortion access. Rather, the interests at stake in the 
narrower question at issue in these cases revolve only around the minor’s access to an 
abortion and her parents’ involvement in that medical choice. 
 281. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979). 
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bodily autonomy, the other interests at stake include those of the 
minor’s parents who might be interested in, say, directing the 
upbringing of their children and ensuring that their children make 
informed choices.282 The public, too, might care about protecting 
the role of parents and ensuring that minors make mature 
choices.283 And, to come full circle, the minor may have important 
interests in not involving or notifying her parents—if, for example, 
her parents are abusive or might throw her out of the family home 
or worse.284 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, even if 
“deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other 
choices facing a minor, the unique nature and consequences of the 
abortion decision make it inappropriate ‘to give a third party an 
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the 
physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy.’”285 
So we pose the question again: Who would be the right 
decisionmaker in terms of accountability, expertise, and discretion? 
Answering this question is made somewhat easier by focusing on the 
Supreme Court’s guidance about what ought to animate the 
inquiry—namely, the maturity of the minor and the degree to which 
she is informed of her options. What institutional characteristics 
make one best situated to evaluate these two questions? 
First, take electoral accountability. Here, as with name change 
applications, electoral accountability might be undesirable because 
it could distort the decisionmaking process in pernicious ways.286 
For example, an electorally accountable decisionmaker might be 
more inclined to reject minors’ bypass applications in order to 
 
 282. See id. at 637 (“[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children 
justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors.”); cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 
(1968) (“[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to 
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the 
structure of our society.”). 
 283. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634 (“The unique role in our society of the family, the 
institution by which ‘we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral 
and cultural,’ requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility 
to the special needs of parents and children.” (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 
431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (citation omitted))). 
 284. See, e.g., Redden, supra note 81 (offering the example of a young woman in 
Alabama who sought a judicial bypass because, among other things, “[h]er father had told 
her that if she ever came home pregnant he would kill her”). 
 285. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). 
 286. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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demonstrate his anti-abortion or “pro-family” bona fides. From this 
perspective, an unelected judge would be a well-positioned 
decisionmaker, but the fact that most state court judges are elected 
should raise concerns about excessive political accountability.287 
The fact that parents have some interests at stake does not do much 
to explain away this concern; after all, electoral accountability 
means accountability to the broader electorate, not just the parents. 
And while the danger from the minors’ perspective is by far the 
more real-world one, broad political accountability at least in 
theory risks interfering with the parents’ interests too. At least on 
the face of things, it is plausible that the electorally accountable 
decisionmaker would put a thumb on the scale in favor of minors’ 
bypass applications in order to demonstrate his pro-choice bona 
fides to that electorate. So neither the minor’s interests nor the 
parents’ interests provide much support for a politically 
accountable decisionmaker. Instead, both of them suggest a role for 
a more politically insulated decisionmaker. 
What might provide the necessary justification for the 
electorally accountable decisionmaker, then, is the public’s interest. 
While the set of possible name change decisions that are not in the 
public interest is small and somewhat easily drawn, the set of 
decisions in this context that are not in the public interest is, at a 
minimum, subject to much more contestation. Of course, as just 
discussed, the public might well care about increasing or 
decreasing the number of minors receiving abortions without 
parental involvement, full stop. But that is not my meaning here 
because, given the way that the Court has framed the inquiry, that 
is not how the public’s interest is meant to be understood. Instead, 
the public’s interest ought to be understood as ensuring that those 
minors who do receive abortions without parental consent are only 
those who are mature enough and well-enough informed to do so, 
however many that might be.288 In comparison to the name change 
 
 287. See Canes-Wrone et al., supra note 243, at 224, 228 (finding that, in states with 
judicial retention and nonpartisan elections, “a 10 percentage point increase in pro-life public 
opinion increases the likelihood of a pro-life vote [by the elected judge] by 8-10 percent[],” 
and concluding that “retention elections encourage judges to be responsive to public opinion 
on hot-button issues”); Croley, supra note 216, at 727–28 (“The protection of abortion rights 
in judicial districts where the protection of such rights is disfavored by a majority  
constitutes another example where the protection of constitutional rights may be threatened 
by electoral accountability.”). 
 288. See supra notes 281–285 and accompanying text. 
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context, this version of the public interest might admit of a slightly 
wider and more contestable band of possible “wrong” answers for 
which the public might justifiably want to punish an erring 
decisionmaker. And framed in this way, the public’s role needs not 
come at the expense of the minor or the parents but would instead 
give the minor (or parents) the ability to call on the electorate to 
help her (or them) vindicate her (or their) interests. 
On the other hand, though, the public always has an interest in 
ensuring that rights-holders receive the protection to which they 
are entitled, but no more, lest that protection impact the interests of 
others.289 We do not generally say as a result that all decisions made 
about rights must be or even should be made by politically 
accountable actors. Doing so would prove far too much. The 
conclusion, then, is similar to the name change context: 
accountability is of questionable value in a decisionmaker here. 
Next, what of expertise? Now, in contrast to the name change 
context, there is a fairly meaningful role for expertise. The inquiry 
in question requires the decisionmaker to understand child 
psychology, medicine, and perhaps more. This is not to say that a 
generalist cannot develop such expertise over time, but it would be 
easier for the decisionmaker to do so if his or her job was science-
based and centered around children and their needs. 
Third and finally, we turn to the question of individualized 
discretion. In contrast again to the name change context, where the 
interests at stake are fairly easy to weigh, it must be admitted that 
striking such a balance is not as easy here. Whereas questions like 
whether a name change is being sought to evade justice have an 
objective, verifiable answer, questions like whether a particular 
minor is sufficiently mature might not. As a result, it is hard to 
credibly say that no discretion should be afforded to the 
decisionmaker. But the foregoing discussion makes clear at the 
same time that the decisionmaker’s discretion must be strictly 
limited to the question at hand: the minor’s level of maturity and 
information. The evil to be avoided most of all is the decisionmaker 
 
 289. Cf. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 998 F. Supp. 2d 912, 935 (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 
743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. 
Burwell, 575 U.S. 901 (2015), and aff’d sub nom. 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The public—
however one chooses to define that vague term—certainly has an interest in the vindication 
of First Amendment rights. But it also has an interest in the full enforcement of duly  
enacted laws.”). 
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substituting his or her feelings about abortion access vel non for a 
careful evaluation of this minor’s circumstances.290 Indeed, there is 
no shortage of reports of judges denying minors’ bypass requests 
on grounds other than those provided by law—that is, having 
nothing to do with the minor’s maturity or circumstances and 
instead having to do with the judge’s beliefs about abortion and 
about those who perform abortions.291 One court officer in Alabama 
reportedly said, 
“My judge is anti-abortion, and he doesn’t believe a child should 
have this done without her parents. You have the right to file . . . . 
But that doesn’t mean he will grant it. We had one [case] one 
time . . . and her doctor advised her to have an abortion for 
medical reasons, and [the judge] still would not grant it.”292  
Similar stories arise in other states as well.293 Given the unavoidable 
fact that this particular issue is not only contentious but one about 
which government officials routinely push the envelope in an effort 
to pare back access,294 it is crucial to ensure that the necessary 
discretion not be unfettered, and that those fetters be enforced. 
 
 290. When Justice Souter was a trial court judge in New Hampshire, he spoke out 
against a New Hampshire parental consent and judicial bypass bill and specifically noted 
this danger. See Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in 
Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 83–84 (1995) (quoting John 
Milne, Souter Note Helped Sink ‘81 N.H. Bill on Abortion; Letter Seen Offering No Clue to Personal 
Views, BOS. GLOBE, July 26, 1990, at 1). 
 291. See Redden, supra note 81 (discussing, for example, a case in which a judge denied 
a bypass petition because she felt that the abortion provider was a “butcher” who just wanted 
“this young lady’s money,” and in which that decision was affirmed on appeal);  
HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS 85 (2007) 
(quoting one court employee in Alabama saying, “I can 100 percent guarantee you that [the 
judge] will not grant [the petition]. The family court judge does not believe it is an issue that 
should be decided by the court. The judge will not grant it; it’s the judge’s decision. He will 
not grant it.”). 
 292. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 291. At a bypass hearing, a judge reportedly said to the 
minor appearing before him, “What you have asked the Court to allow you to do is 
something that is extremely serious and fatal to your child.” Id. at 129. And another judge is 
known to tell minors, “This is an enormous decision, and I don’t want you to make it.” Id. 
 293. See, e.g., Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 290, at 86, 91–92 (collecting similar stories 
in other states); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 291, at 116–17 (same). 
 294. See, e.g., Gabe Rosenberg, A Bill Banning Most Abortions Becomes Law in Ohio, NPR 
(Apr. 11, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/11/712455980/a-bill-banning-
most-abortions-becomes-law-in-ohio (observing that Ohio became the sixth state to outlaw 
abortion once a fetal heartbeat can be detected, which is long before the timeframe set out in 
Roe v. Wade, and quoting a legislator as saying, “Will there be a lawsuit? Yeah, we are 
counting on it . . . . We’re counting on it. We’re excited about it.”). 
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So as with name changes, the state judiciary may not be the best 
place to put this particular task.295 Both contexts raise similar 
concerns about political accountability that cut against elected 
judges serving as the decisionmakers, and while there is a stronger 
argument for discretion in the abortion context (which might 
militate in favor of the judiciary), there is also a stronger argument 
for expertise (which might militate against it). Once again, then, this 
may be an area where an unelected, expert bureaucrat like an 
official in the state’s department of health or department of child 
services could play an important role.296  
But whether the decisionmakers remain the judges or are 
instead expert bureaucrats, strict limits must be imposed on the 
exercise of their discretion. Formally, at least, most states do a better 
job here than they do with name change applications. As discussed 
above, most states provide that the judge “shall” waive the 
applicable parental involvement requirement if the judge 
determines that such parental involvement would “not be in the 
best interest of the minor” or that “the minor is sufficiently mature 
to decide whether to have an abortion.”297 Some even list specific 
factors the judge must consider.298 And most states go a step further 
and require the judge to include “specific factual findings” in 
support of their orders.299 By limiting the grounds on which the 
judge’s decision can rest and by requiring the judge to make 
specific findings in support of those limited inquiries, these statutes 
impose fetters on the judge and thus—again, formally—minimize 
the risk of improper discretion or excessive political influence. In 
light of the importance of such precautions, states certainly ought 
to maintain them. Every state would also do well to make clear that 
whatever factors it requires the judge to consider are exclusive of 
other considerations—like, say, the judge’s views about abortion. 
 
 295. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 296. Here, in particular, one might expect that a professional in a state’s department of 
child services, for example, might use his or her expertise to prioritize the welfare of the 
minor applicant in the face of political efforts to interfere with her rights. Cf. George, supra 
note 247, at 85–86. Working with such a professional might also be a less intimidating and 
frightening experience for the minor applicant than appearing before a judge. See supra note 
81 and accompanying text. 
 297. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-707(1)(a) (West 2020); see supra Section I.B. 
 298. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c)(1) (2019); supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 299. § 13-22-707(1)(a); see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
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But the more important reform would be to make sure that 
these formal limits on judges’ discretion truly operate to limit  
that discretion. One important way of doing that would be to 
explicitly provide for appellate review that is more active and that 
better fits the administrative quality of the action. Specifically, just 
as with name changes, these states should require the judge  
to articulate the reasons in support of his decision and to compile  
a factual record that provides real support for those reasons,  
and should empower appellate courts to promptly reverse if  
these requirements are not complied with.300 Such a reform  
would ensure, for example, that bypass denials based on little  
more than the judge’s views about abortion—when the law calls 
instead for an evaluation of the minor’s circumstances—would not  
be affirmed.301 
3. Attorney admission and discipline 
Finally, turning to bar admission and discipline,302 there is a 
somewhat stronger argument that judges are the right 
decisionmakers here. The interests at stake are primarily those of 
the attorney (or would-be attorney) and those of their clients or 
future clients in the broader public. That is, as with any licensed or 
regulated profession, the governing body must protect the public 
from unqualified or unscrupulous professionals and must at the 
same time deal fairly with those participating in or seeking to 
participate in the profession.303 So subject individuals have an 
interest in receiving and keeping their licenses to practice law,304 
and clients and the public have an interest in the wrong people not 
receiving or retaining those licenses. The public’s interest here is 
thus somewhat greater than that of the public in the name change 
or abortion contexts. That is, an admission or discipline decision 
 
 300. See supra notes 255–276 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra Section I.C. 
 303. Other attorneys might be said to have some interest in the reputation of the 
profession and in the proper enforcement of the profession’s rules, but that interest is, for 
present purposes at least, mostly accounted for by the subject attorney and by the clients and 
future clients. 
 304. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (citation omitted) (“Suspension of issued 
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees.  
In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
2.POLLACK_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2021  1:44 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:3 (2021) 
788 
 
that unwarrantedly favors the attorney might harm more people—
in the sense of subjecting them to deficient or insidious attorneys—
than a name change or abortion decision that unwarrantedly favors 
the applicant ever could. 
On the electoral accountability front, then, the notion that the 
bar gatekeeper ought to be accountable to the public has some 
resonance. Indeed, as discussed above, there have often been calls 
to move the regulation of attorneys out of the courts and into the 
accountable legislative sphere for precisely this reason.305 On the 
other hand, some (mostly judges and attorneys) have argued that, 
as then-Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo put it, “[If] the house is to 
be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than 
strangers, to do the noisome work.”306 On this view, it is 
emphatically not the job of the public, but rather of the courts 
themselves, to regulate and discipline the bar. And the public 
should trust the bar, the story goes, because attorneys as a group, 
and the judges who come from their ranks and govern the bar, 
ought to have little interest in degrading their reputation by 
association with such bad actors.307 Yet another rejoinder often 
offered to the prospect of more electorally accountable control of 
the bar is that too much accountability is in fact undesirable. On an 
individual level, just as with name changes and abortion, a given 
attorney or attorney candidate might worry that electoral 
accountability would come at the expense of his own interest by 
distorting the decisionmaker’s consideration of his case. And on a 
more systemic level, attorneys as a whole might worry that 
“legislative regulation, subject to political influence, would impair 
the independence of lawyers” and make them beholden to 
dominant political forces rather than to their clients and to  
the law.308 
So, when it comes to electoral accountability, we have a more 
mixed bag than we do in the name change and abortion arenas 
where there is a simpler story to tell about the pernicious side  
 
 305. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text. Even the American Bar 
Association has recognized this danger, although it has always vehemently resisted 
addressing it through legislative oversight. See Devlin, supra note 110, at 921–31. 
 306. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). 
 307. See id. at 488 (observing that “[t]he bar as a whole felt the sting of the discredit thus 
put upon its membership by an unscrupulous minority”). 
 308. Devlin, supra note 110, at 930 (referencing concerns articulated by the ABA). 
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of accountability. That pernicious side exists here too, but with 
more upside. But when we turn to expertise and discretion, the 
argument in favor of judges serving as the relevant decisionmakers 
is amplified. As with the abortion context, there is a meaningful role 
for expertise—expertise in the norms and rules of attorney conduct, 
in the problems that attorneys and clients encounter, and in the 
ethical qualifications required of attorneys. But unlike the abortion 
context, the judges are among those who possess that expertise. 
And because many attorney discipline and admission questions 
involve gray areas that necessarily call for the exercise of 
professional judgment, it is important that the relevant 
decisionmaker be in a position to call upon her own lawyerly 
judgment and discretion. State court judges are well suited to carry 
out that role. 
In contrast, then, to the other two quasi-administrative roles 
that state court judges play, this one carries some added 
justifications in the first instance. It is far from perfect, though, and 
calls for broader accountability must be taken seriously given the 
serious public interests at stake. Short of reallocating the 
decisionmaking authority—which would raise problems of its 
own—it is therefore important for the bar admission and discipline 
process to be transparent to the public and to feature clear 
standards that are rigorously enforced.309 If state courts are failing 
to meet that burden on their own, the imposition of minimum 
standards as guardrails ought to be considered by legislatures. 
But a larger problem lurks that is unique to this context: there 
is little to no avenue for meaningful appellate review. While most 
of the concerns driving calls for greater accountability are rooted in 
the public interest, the simultaneously significant interest of the 
attorney or candidate attorney means that the possibility of an 
erroneous decision against the attorney cannot be ignored.310 The 
foregoing analysis of the other two quasi-administrative contexts 
discussed the ways in which states need to ensure that applicants 
can have adverse decisions reviewed for more than mere abuse-of-
discretion review in higher state courts, but at least as a structural 
matter, such review is at least available in those arenas. In this 
 
 309. The American Bar Association has made similar calls for transparency and has 
driven disciplinary reforms in that direction. See id. at 928–29. 
 310. See, e.g., Leaf v. Sup. Ct. of State of Wis., 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992) (attorney 
alleging bias in, and raising constitutional challenges to, disciplinary procedures he faced). 
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context, by contrast, the decisionmaker is usually not a trial-level 
judge but is often instead the state’s highest court.311 In-state 
appellate review is therefore often not available at all. 
Due to a doctrine of federal jurisdiction, federal court review is 
generally not available either.312 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 
generally understood to prohibit relitigation in federal courts 
(besides the Supreme Court) of a case decided in state court.313 
Indeed, the “Feldman” half of Rooker-Feldman was itself a case about 
bar admission decisions. Marc Feldman applied for a license to 
practice law in the District of Columbia and was rejected by the 
District’s highest court, the Court of Appeals. He then filed a suit in 
federal district court challenging the Court of Appeals’ decision. 
The district court dismissed his complaint, concluding that it could 
not “review[] an order of a jurisdiction’s highest court.”314 The D.C. 
Circuit disagreed, characterizing the admission decision as an 
administrative decision rather than a judicial one.315 The Supreme 
Court, however, agreed with the district court, reasoning that the 
bar admission proceedings at issue were in fact “judicial” and that, 
accordingly, no review could lie in federal court.316 The upshot, 
then, is that attorney candidates and attorneys who have been 
aggrieved by a state high court’s admission or discipline decision 
are without any opportunity to have that decision reviewed by 
 
 311. See Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground Up, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1132 (1999). But see N.Y. JUD. L. § 90 (McKinney 2020) (providing 
that the intermediate court of appeals has power to admit and discipline attorneys). 
 312. An aggrieved party can seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court from the state 
high court’s judgment, but that is “too rare to be meaningful.” Friedman & Gaylord, supra 
note 311, at 1132 n.20. One source estimates that the Supreme Court grants between one and 
two percent of all petitions filed, and an individual seeking mere error-correction is 
exceptionally unlikely to fit the bill. See Adam Feldman, Cert Analytics, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS 
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/01/10/cert-analytics/. 
 313. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 
U.S. 462 (1983); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,  
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman prohibits “state-court losers” from seeking federal  
“district court review and rejection” of “state-court judgments”); Friedman & Gaylord,  
supra note 311, at 1134. 
 314. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 470. 
 315. Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom.  
D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (acknowledging that “review of a final 
judgment of the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme Court of 
the United States,” but concluding that the district court had jurisdiction here because the 
bar proceedings “were not judicial”). 
 316. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 481; see supra note 123. 
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anyone, save for the remote possibility of a grant of certiorari in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
In light of the interests at stake, this is an intolerable result. For 
one thing, individuals subject to other professional licensing and 
regulatory bodies do have the opportunity to appeal adverse 
decisions to a higher state court, because the decision would not 
have been made in the first instance by that high court.317 The 
anomaly that the attorney licensing organization is the high court 
does not on its own justify the different result. One option, then, as 
Barry Friedman and James Gaylord have argued, is “to remove the 
attorney disciplinary process from the state supreme courts.”318 
That would certainly solve this particular problem, but it might 
raise problems of its own. That is, for the reasons discussed above, 
the state courts might actually be well-suited to handle these issues; 
other state agencies might be less well-suited to do so. Perhaps 
attorney admission and discipline decisions could more widely be 
moved to lower state courts, as in states like New York, but 
concerns about disuniformity, or about individual judges making 
admissions decisions that would put attorneys before other judges 
who might not have admitted that attorney had they had the 
choice, might militate against doing so.319 After all, in contrast to 
the name change and the abortion contexts, the admitted attorneys 
will be repeat players in the state court system, interacting with the 
judges themselves. This introduces a more meaningful systemic 
interest in reducing the number of gatekeepers and thus reducing 
the potential for inconsistent decisions. Another option might be to 
provide a special state court of appeal in which review could be had 
of the bar decisions of the state high court.320 But this work-around, 
while perhaps effective, is cumbersome. 
 
 317. See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 311, at 1163 (“The ironic result of Feldman is 
that lawyers and judges in licensing and disciplinary cases receive less process due them 
than any other individuals or entities in similar circumstances receive.”). 
 318. Id. at 1171. 
 319. In New York, attorneys are admitted and disciplined by the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court, which is the state’s intermediate court. See N.Y. JUD. L. § 90 (McKinney 
2020). Attorneys facing discipline “shall have the right to appeal to the court of appeals from 
a final order of any appellate division.” Id. § 90(8). 
 320. Cf. Court of the Judiciary Overview, ALA. JUD. SYS., http://judicial.alabama.gov/ 
appellate/judiciary (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (providing for a special court in which judicial 
officers may be tried for violations of canons of judicial conduct). 
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The cleanest solution, then, might be to overrule Feldman, not 
just because Feldman is deeply mistaken on its own terms, but 
because the foregoing analysis reveals that doing so would yield 
important results on the ground. To be clear, doing so need not 
mean abandoning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself: judicial 
decisions of state high courts should remain immune from review 
in federal district courts.321 But overruling Feldman would simply 
recognize that the decision made by the D.C. Court of Appeals in 
that case was, contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling, not judicial 
but rather administrative—or, at least, to use the language of this 
Article, quasi-administrative. As Justice Stevens aptly put it in his 
dissent in the case, the D.C. Court of Appeals, when handling 
Feldman’s admission application, “performed no more and no less 
than the administrative function of a licensing board.”322 Moreover, 
overruling Feldman would better reflect the interests at stake and 
the nature of the decision at issue. After all, if Feldman were 
seeking a license to practice medicine or to braid hair, he would 
have initially appeared before a state administrative agency (one 
that was indisputably administrative) and would have been able to 
appeal from an adverse decision to some court.323 As Friedman and 
Gaylord put it, “[i]t is just happenstance that when the applicant is 
a lawyer, the administrative agency in many states is also the 
highest court.”324 That is, the Court in Feldman seems to have been 
distracted by the fact that a court was the decisionmaker. But 
recognizing, as this Article illustrates, just how many functions are 
 
 321. This is not to say that related critiques of the unwarranted expansion of the 
doctrine are mistaken, because they are not. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) (“Variously interpreted in the lower courts, the doctrine has 
sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, 
overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction 
exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law . . . .”); 
VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 404–09 (6th Cir. 2020) (Sutton, J., 
concurring) (similarly lamenting that federal courts still erroneously “pull[] into [Rooker-
Feldman’s] vortex . . . many things the rule does not do”). But rather than being centered on 
expansion, the critique offered here is centered on Feldman itself and is therefore aimed at 
reframing the boundaries of the heartland of Rooker-Feldman. 
 322. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 489 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
see Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 311, at 1172 (calling it “obvious” that Justice Stevens  
was correct). 
 323. A litigant seeking to come to federal court would still, of course, have to articulate 
some federal question, whether it be procedural due process, equal protection, or the like. 
Feldman’s original complaint raised due process challenges. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 469 n.3. 
 324. Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 311, at 1172. 
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truly served by the state courts puts the Court’s error in bold relief. 
And its confusion is no excuse for continuing to relegate attorneys 
to lesser process than other regulated professionals enjoy.325 
 
* * * 
 
With respect to the legislative and law enforcement functions 
analyzed above, it was fair to conclude that the departures from the 
traditional judge’s dispute-resolution role were, at least in some 
applications, moderately if imperfectly defensible. When it comes 
to these quasi-administrative tasks, by contrast, the accountability, 
expertise, and discretion considerations point in a more troubling 
direction. While judges are often electorally accountable, and while 
that helped support their quasi-legislative roles, that fact cuts 
against their being the appropriate decisionmaker here, where there 
are concerns that they will privilege the preferences of the 
electorate over the claim of the applicant. This concern arises with 
particular strength in the name change and abortion contexts, as 
illustrated, but it is likely to animate many similar quasi-
administrative functions for the simple fact that these are the 
contexts in which citizens are approaching their government 
seeking permission to do something that might pit them against 
others in their community. Moreover, many such functions 
demand subject-matter expertise to which judges—with the 
exception of attorney admission and discipline—have no particular 
claim. Finally, and again due to the nature of the task, these are 
arenas in which one might justifiably worry that the decision not be 
too discretionary lest the decisionmaker’s personal views unduly 
motivate her decision. 
For all of these reasons, it is worth considering whether to 
reallocate these functions to other institutions of state government. 
But even if they remain with the judges, it is crucial to mitigate 
these concerns by tightly defining the criteria the judges are to 
evaluate and by holding them to those criteria by imposing reason-
giving obligations and by enforcing those obligations with rigorous 
appellate review. And where that review cannot be had in state 
courts, the federal courts ought to be opened to it. 
 
 325. See id. at 1173; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that the 
licensing function in the legal profession is controlled by the judiciary is not a sufficient 
reason to immunize allegedly unconstitutional conduct from review in the federal courts.”). 
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The state courts are responsible for a wide range of functions 
beyond traditional “judging.” Whether they have been assigned 
that role by state law or have taken it on for themselves, the result 
is that the state courts must be understood and evaluated, not 
simply as sites of dispute resolution, but as institutions of state 
government—and ones that are far more complicated and 
multifaceted than previously recognized. As this Article has 
shown, careful examination of the functions served by state courts 
reveals that the hats the state courts wear come in a variety of 
shapes and sizes. But all implicate important interests and pose 
potential institutional design challenges. It is therefore critical to 
ensure that state law and higher courts—to say nothing of scholars, 
citizens, and policy advocates—see the state courts for what they 
truly are. 
Reorienting our thinking about state courts around their more 
complicated reality means paying far more careful attention to 
which hat a state court is wearing in a particular context. It means 
shaping the architecture of decisionmaking one function at a time, 
taking concerted steps to guide, review, or limit the court in the 
ways that will best reflect the most desirable decisionmaking 
processes in each arena and that will best respect the values and 
rights at stake. And, in the end, it means making more conscious 
choices about which tasks those courts ought to be responsible for. 
 
